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Abstract
In most password-authenticated key exchange systems there is a single server storing pass-
word veriﬁcation data. To provide some resilience against server compromise, this data typically
takes the form of a one-way function of the password (and possibly a salt, or other public val-
ues), rather than the password itself. However, if the server is compromised, this password
veriﬁcation data can be used to perform an oﬄine dictionary attack on the user’s password. In
this paper we propose an eﬃcient password-authenticated key exchange system involving a set
of servers with known public keys, in which a certain threshold of servers must participate in
the authentication of a user, and in which the compromise of any fewer than that threshold of
servers does not allow an attacker to perform an oﬄine dictionary attack. We prove our system
is secure in the random oracle model under the Decision Diﬃe-Hellman assumption against an
attacker that may eavesdrop on, insert, delete, or modify messages between the user and servers,
and that compromises fewer than that threshold of servers.
Key words: Password authentication, key exchange, threshold cryptosystems, dictionary attack.
1 Introduction
Many real-world systems today rely on password authentication to verify the identity of a user
before allowing that user to perform certain functions, such as setting up a virtual private network
or downloading secret information. There are many security concerns associated with password
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1authentication, due mainly to the fact that most users’ passwords are drawn from a relatively
small and easily generated dictionary. Thus if information suﬃcient to verify a password guess is
leaked, the password may be found by performing an oﬄine dictionary attack: one can run through
a dictionary of possible passwords, testing each one against the leaked information in order to
determine the correct password.
When password authentication is performed over a network, one must be especially careful not
to allow any leakage of information to one listening in, or even actively attacking, the network.
If one assumes the server’s public key is known (or at least can be veriﬁed) by the user, then
performing password authentication after setting up an anonymous secure channel to the server is
generally suﬃcient to prevent leakage of information, as is done in SSH [37] or on the web using
SSL [16]. Halevi and Krawczyk [28] give the ﬁrst protocol of this type that is proven secure.
The problem becomes more diﬃcult if the server’s public key cannot be veriﬁed by the user.
Solutions to this problem have been coined strong password authentication protocols, and have the
property that (informally) the probability of an active attacker (i.e., one that may eavesdrop on,
insert, delete, or modify messages on a network) impersonating a user is only negligibly better
than a simple on-line guessing attack, consisting of the attacker iteratively guessing passwords and
running the authentication protocol. Strong password authentication protocols were proposed by
Bellovin and Merritt [5, 6], Jablon [31] and Wu [38], among others. Recently, some protocols were
proven secure in the random oracle and/or ideal cipher models1 (Bellare et al. [1], Boyko et al.
[10] and MacKenzie et al. [34]), in the public random string model (Katz et al. [ 3 3 ] ) ,a n di nt h e
standard model2 (Goldreich and Lindell [26]). However, all of these protocols, even the ones in
which the server’s public key is known to the user, are vulnerable to server compromise in the sense
that compromising the server would allow an attacker to obtain the password veriﬁcation data
on that server (typically some type of one-way function of the password and some public values).
This could then be used to perform an oﬄine dictionary attack on the password. To address this
issue (without resorting to assumptions like tamper resistance), Ford and Kaliski [22] proposed to
distribute the functionality of the server, forcing an attacker to compromise several servers in order
to be able to obtain password veriﬁcation data.3 Their protocol assumes the servers have known
public keys. Note that the main problem is not just to distribute the password veriﬁcation data,
but to distribute the functionality, i.e., to distribute the password veriﬁcation data such that it can
be used for authentication without ever reconstructing the data on any set of servers smaller than
a chosen threshold.
While distributed cryptosystems have been studied extensively (and many proven secure) for
other cryptographic operations, such as signatures (e.g., [9, 14, 25, 23]), to our knowledge Ford and
Kaliski were the ﬁrst ones to propose a distributed password-authenticated key exchange system.
However, they give no proof of security for their system. Jablon [32] extends the system of Ford
and Kaliski, most notably to not require the server’s public key to be known to the user, but again
1In the random oracle model [2], a hash function is modeled as a black box containing an ideal random function.
This is not a standard cryptographic assumption. In fact, it is possible for a scheme secure in the random oracle
model to be insecure for any real instantiation of the hash function [11]. However, a proof of security in the random
oracle model is generally thought to be strong evidence of the practical security of a scheme. (The ideal cipher model
is similar to the random oracle model, except that it is a cipher that is modeled as a black box containing a keyed
family of independent random permutations and their inverses.)
2The protocol for the standard model is only proven secure in the case of non-concurrent executions.
3As is well-known in the practice of distributed cryptography, for high security one must be careful to ensure that
it is not easy for an attacker to compromise several servers with the same attack, which may be the case, for instance,
if they are all running the same operating system.
2does not give a proof of security.
Our contributions. In this paper we propose a completely diﬀerent distributed password
authenticated key exchange system and prove it secure in the random oracle model, assuming the
hardness of the Decision Diﬃe-Hellman (DDH) problem [17] (see [8]). Like the system of Ford and
Kaliski, we assume the servers have known public keys. However, while the systems of Ford and
Kaliski and Jablon require all servers to perform authentication, our system is a k-out-of-n threshold
system (for any 1 ≤ k ≤ n), where k servers are required for authentication and the compromise of
k −1 servers does not aﬀect the security of the system. Also, this is the ﬁrst distributed password-
authenticated key exchange system proven secure under any standard cryptographic assumption
in any model, including the random oracle model. To be speciﬁc, we assume the client may store
public data, and our security is against an active attacker that may (statically) compromise any
number of servers less than the speciﬁed threshold.
Informally, one can succinctly state our main result as a distributed password-authenticated
key exchange protocol for which any eﬃcient attacker can do no better than an on-line dictionary
attack as long as the DDH problem is hard, and as long as no more than a threshold k − 1o u to f
n servers are compromised.
Technically, we achieve our result by storing a semantically-secure encryption of a function of
the password at the servers (instead of simply storing a one-way function of the password), and
then leveraging oﬀ some known solutions for distributing secret decryption keys, such as Feldman
veriﬁable secret sharing [20]. In other words, we transform the problem of distributing password
authentication information to the problem of distributing cryptographic keys. However, once we
make this transformation, verifying passwords without leaking information becomes much more
diﬃcult, requiring intricate manipulations of ElGamal encryptions [19] and careful use of eﬃcient
non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [7]. In particular, we note that one cannot immediately
obtain a solution through standard threshold cryptography techniques, since those techniques are
not designed to prevent leakage of information when secrets may be chosen from a small set (e.g.,
when the secrets are passwords).
We note that a threshold password authentication system does not follow from techniques
for general secure multi-party computation (e.g., [27]) since we are working in an asynchronous
model, allow concurrent executions of protocols, and assume no authenticated channels. (Note
in particular that the goal of the protocol is for the client to be authenticated.) The only work
on general secure multi-party computation in an asynchronous model, and allowing concurrency,
assumes authenticated channels [12].
Related work. Subsequent to our work, Di Raimondo and Gennaro [18] presented a distributed
password-authenticated key exchange protocol based on the protocol of [33]. Here we highlight the
diﬀerences from our protocol. Their protocol does not assume the servers have known public keys,
whereas ours assumes the servers have known public keys Their protocol is in the public random
string model, whereas ours is proven secure in the random oracle model. Their protocol requires a
threshold k where 3k<n , and requires all n servers to be active. Ours allows any threshold k<n ,
and allows only k servers to be active when no malicious behavior occurs.
2M o d e l
We extend the model of [1] (which builds on [3] and [4], and is also used by [33]). The model of [1]
was designed for the problem of authenticated key exchange (ake) between two parties, a client and
3a server. The goal was for them to engage in a protocol such that after the protocol was completed,
they would each hold a session key that is known to nobody but the two of them. Our model is
designed for the problem of distributed authenticated key exchange (dake) between a client and k
servers. The goal is for them to engage in a protocol such that after the protocol is completed,
the client would hold k session keys, one being shared with each server, such that the session key
shared between the client and a given server is known to nobody but the two of them, even if up
to k − 1 other servers were to conspire together.
Note that this deﬁnition is in some sense optimized for the case when the servers do not misbe-
have. The client simply contacts any k servers and runs the protocol. If fewer than k servers do not
perform the protocol honestly, then at least one uncompromised server will notice this, and the pro-
tocol will fail. This problem may be resolved in many ways, the simplest being the client iteratively
trying diﬀerent sets of k servers. Eventually, of course, the system must determine the compromised
servers and reset the system, possibly using techniques from proactive security [30, 29]. These issues
are beyond the scope of this paper. Here we focus on the basic protocol.
Remark 2.1 The way we have deﬁned dake, the client ends up with k shared keys, while the
goal of a standard authenticated key exchange is for the client to end up with a single key shared
with a server it wishes to communicate with. There are alternative deﬁnitions that would more
closely mimic this. However, we feel our deﬁnition is more general, since once the client can securely
communicate with k servers, it can use this not only to enable secure communication with any other
desired server, but to enable any desired cryptographic functionality. For instance, a secure dake
protocol allows for secure downloadable credentials, by, e.g., having the servers store an encrypted
credentials ﬁle with a decryption key stored using a threshold scheme among them, and then having
each send a partial decryption of the credentials ﬁle to the client, encrypted with the session key
it shares with the client. (To deal with compromised servers, one could require each server to
also send a zero-knowledge proof that it performed its partial decryption correctly.) Note that the
credentials are secure in a threshold sense: fewer than the given threshold of servers are unable
to obtain the credentials. Once the client has securely downloaded its credentials (for instance, it
could download its certiﬁed public key and the associated private key), it can use these credentials
to set up secure communication with another server, or perhaps sign messages, or perform other
cryptographic operations. Details of these applications are beyond the scope of this paper.
In the following, we will assume some familiarity with the model of [1].
Protocol participants. We have two types of protocol participants: clients and servers. Let
ID
def = Clients ∪ Servers be a non-empty set of protocol participants, or principals.
We assume Servers consists of n servers, denoted {S1,...,S n}, and that these servers are meant
to cooperate in authenticating a client.4 Each client C ∈ Clients has a secret password πC,a n d
each server S ∈ Servers has a vector πS =[ πS [C]]C∈Clients.E n t r yπS[C]i st h epassword record.L e t
PasswordC be a (possibly small) set from which passwords for client C are selected. We will assume
that πC
R ← PasswordC (but our results easily extend to other password distributions). Clients and
servers are modeled as probabilistic poly-time algorithms with an input tape and an output tape.
Execution of the protocol. Ap r o t o c o lP is an algorithm that determines how principals behave
in response to inputs from their environment. In the real world, each principal is able to execute
4Our model could be extended to have multiple sets of servers, but for clarity of presentation we omit this extension.
4P multiple times with diﬀerent partners, and we model this by allowing an unlimited number of
instances of each principal. Instance i of principal U ∈ ID is denoted ΠU
i .
To describe the security of the protocol, we assume there is an adversary A that has complete
control over the environment (mainly, the network), and thus provides the inputs to instances of
principals. (Note in particular that we do not assume the communication between any parties
is authenticated or private, even between servers.) We will further assume the network (i.e., A)
performs aggregation and broadcast functions.5 In practice, on a point-to-point network, the pro-
tocol implementor would most likely have to implement these functionalities in some way, perhaps
using a single intermediate (untrusted) node to aggregate and broadcast messages6. Formally, the
adversary is a probabilistic algorithm with a distinguished query tape. Queries written to this tape
are responded to by principals according to P; the allowed queries are formally deﬁned in [1] and
summarized here (with slight modiﬁcations for multiple servers):
Send (U, i, M): causes message M to be sent to instance ΠU
i . The instance computes what the
protocol says to, state is updated, and the output message is given to A. If this query causes
ΠU
i to accept or terminate, this will also be shown to A. To initiate a session between client
C and a set of servers, the adversary should send a message containing a set I of k indices of
servers in Servers to an unused instance of C.
Execute (C,i,((Sj1,  j1),...,(Sjk,  jk))): causes P to be executed to completion between ΠC
i (where
C ∈ Clients) and Π
Sj1
 j1 ,...,Π
Sjk
 jk
, and outputs the transcript of the execution. (This transcript
includes all protocol messages, even those from server to server.) This query captures the
intuition of a passive adversary who simply eavesdrops on the execution of P.
Reveal (C, i, Sj): causes the output of the session key held by ΠC
i corresponding to server Sj, i.e.,
ski
C,Sj.
Reveal (Sj,i ): causes the output of the session key held by Π
Sj
i , i.e., ski
Sj.
Test (C, i, Sj): causes ΠC
i to ﬂip a bit b.I f b = 1 the session key ski
C,Sj is output and if b =0
a string drawn uniformly from the space of session keys is output. A Test query (of either
type) may be asked at any time during the execution of P, but may only be asked once.
Test (Sj,i ): causes Π
Sj
i to ﬂip a bit b.I fb = 1 the session key ski
Sj is output; otherwise, a string is
drawn uniformly from the space of session keys and output. As above, a Test query (of either
type) may be asked at any time during the execution of P, but may only be asked once.
The Reveal queries are used to model an adversary who obtains information on session keys
in some sessions, and the Test queries are a technical addition to the model that will allow us to
determine if an adversary can distinguish a true session key from a random key.
We assume A may compromise up to k−1 servers, and that the choice of these servers is static.
In particular, without loss of generality, we may assume the choice is made before initialization,
and we may simply assume the adversary has access to the private keys of the compromised servers.
5This is more for notational convenience than anything else. In particular, we make no assumptions about
synchronicity or any type of distributed consensus.
6Note that since A controls the network and can deny service at any time, we do not concern ourselves with any
denial-of-service attacks that this single intermediate node may facilitate.
5Partnering. A server instance that accepts holds a partner-id pid, session-id sid, and a session
key sk. A client instance that accepts holds a partner-id pid consisting of a set of k server indices,
a session-id sid,a n das e to fk session keys (skj1,...,sk jk). Let sid be the concatenation of all
messages (or pre-speciﬁed compacted representations of the messages) sent and received by the
client instance in its communication with the set of servers. (Note that this excludes messages
that are sent only between servers, but not to the client. Also, as discussed above, we assume
the network performs aggregation and broadcast functions so each server can see the messages
communicated between the client and other servers, and thus can construct sid.) Then instances ΠC
i
(with C ∈ Clients) holding (pid,sid,(skj1,...,skjk)), where pid = I for some set I = {j1,...,j k},
and Π
Sj
 j (with Sj ∈ Servers) holding (pid ,sid ,sk) are said to be partnered if j ∈ I, pid  = C,
sid = sid ,a n dskj = sk. This is basically the so-called “matching conversation” approach to
deﬁning partnering, as used in [3, 1].
Freshness. A client instance/server pair (ΠC
i ,S j)i sfresh if (1) Sj is not compromised, (2)
there has been no Reveal (C, i, Sj) query, and (3) if Π
Sj
  is a partner to ΠC
i , there has been no
Reveal (Sj,  ) query. A server instance Π
Sj
i is fresh if (1) Sj is not compromised, (2) there has been
no Reveal (Sj,i ) query, and (3) if ΠC
  is the partner to Π
Sj
i , there has been no Reveal (C,  , Sj)
query. Intuitively, the adversary should not be able to distinguish random keys from session keys
held by fresh instances.
Advantage of the adversary. We now formally deﬁne the distributed authenticated key
exchange (dake) advantage of the adversary against protocol P.L e tSuccdake
P (A) be the event that
(1) A makes a single Test query directed to some client instance/server pair (ΠC
i ,S j)t h a ti sf r e s h
and where ΠC
i has terminated, or (2) A makes a single Test query directed to some server instance
Π
Sj
i that has terminated and is fresh, and eventually A outputs a bit b ,w h e r eb  = b for the bit b
that was selected in the Test query. The dake advantage of A attacking P is deﬁned to be
Advdake
P (A)
def =2 P r
 
Succdake
P (A)
 
− 1.
The following fact is easily veriﬁed.
Fact 2.2 Pr(Succdake
P (A)) = Pr(Succdake
P  (A)) +   ⇐⇒ Advdake
P (A)=Advdake
P  (A)+2  .
3 Deﬁnitions
Let κ be the cryptographic security parameter. Let Gq denote a ﬁnite (cyclic) group of order q,
where |q| = κ.L e tg be a generator of Gq, and assume it is included in the description of Gq.
Notation. We use (a,b) × (c,d) to mean elementwise multiplication, i.e., (ac,bd). We use (a,b)r
to mean elementwise exponentiation, i.e., (ar,b r). For a tuple V , the notation V [j] means the jth
element of V .
We denote by Ω the set of all functions H from {0,1}∗ to {0,1}∞. This set is provided with
a probability measure by saying that a random H from Ω assigns to each x ∈{ 0,1}∗ a sequence
of bits each of which is selected uniformly at random. As shown in [2], this sequence of bits may
be used to deﬁne the output of H in a speciﬁc set, and thus we will assume that we can specify
that the output of a random oracle H be interpreted as a (random) element of Gq.7 Access to any
7For instance, this can be easily deﬁned when Gq is a q-order subgroup of Z
∗
p,w h e r eq and p are prime.
6public random oracle H ∈ Ω is given to all algorithms; speciﬁcally, it is given to the protocol P
and the adversary A. Assume that secret session keys are drawn from {0,1}κ.
A function f : Z → [0,1] is negligible if for all α>0 there exists an κα > 0 such that for all
κ>κ α, f(κ) < |κ|−α. All functions we use in this paper will include a security parameter as input,
either implicitly or explicitly, and we say that these functions are negligible if they are negligible
in the security parameter. (They will be polynomial in all other parameters.)
4P r o t o c o l
In this section we describe our protocol for threshold password-authenticated key exchange. In the
next section we prove this protocol is secure under the DDH assumption [8, 17] in the random-oracle
model [2].
4.1 Server Setup
Let there be n servers {Si}i∈{1,2,...,n}.L e t( x,y) be the servers’ global key pair such that y = gx.T h e
servers share the global secret key x using a (k,n)-threshold Feldman secret sharing protocol [20].
Speciﬁcally, a polynomial f(z)=
 k−1
j=0 ajzj mod q is chosen with a0 ← x and random coeﬃcients
aj
R ← Zq for j>0. Then each server Si gets a secret share xi = f(i) and a corresponding public
share yi = gxi,1≤ i ≤ n. (In this paper we assume that a trusted dealer generates these shares,
but it should be possible to have the servers generate them using a distributed protocol, as in
Gennaro et al. [24].) In addition, each server Si independently generates its own local key pair
(x 
i,y 
i) such that y 
i = gx 
i,1≤ i ≤ n.E a c h s e r v e r Si publishes its local public key y 
i along with
its share of the global public key yi. Note that we assume that the adversary does not participate
in the system setup phase, so all keys are generated honestly. Let H0,H 1,H 2,H 3,H 4,H 5,H 6
R ← Ω
be random oracles with domain and range deﬁned by the context of their use. Let h ← H0(y)a n d
h  ← H1(y) be generators for Gq.
Remark 4.1 We note that in the following protocol the servers are assumed to have stored the
2n+1 public values y, {y 
i}n
i=1,a n d{yi}n
i=1. Likewise, the client is assumed to have stored the n+1
public values y and {y 
i}n
i=1. (Alternatively, a trusted certiﬁcation authority (CA) could certify
these values, but we choose to keep our model as simple as possible.)
4.2 Client Setup
A client C ∈ Clients has a secret password πC drawn from a set PasswordC. We assume PasswordC
c a nb em a p p e di n t oZ∗
q, and for the remainder of the paper, we use passwords as if they were
elements of Z∗
q. C creates an ElGamal ciphertext EC of the value g(πC)−1
, using the servers’ global
public key y. More precisely, he selects α
R ← Zq and computes EC ← (yαg(πC)−1
,gα). He sends EC
to each of the servers Si,1≤ i ≤ n, who record (C,EC) in their database. (Alternatively, a trusted
CA could be used, but again we choose to keep our model as simple as possible.) We consider EC
to be public information, and in our protocol, we assume that the client knows EC. The client
could simply store EC, or obtain a (certiﬁed) copy of EC through interaction with the servers. (It
should be clear that storing EC at the client is not the same as storing a shared secret key.) We
also assume the adversary does not observe or participate in the system and client setup phases.
(Of course, the adversary could learn EC by corrupting any server. Indeed, this is why we cannot
assume EC is private.)
74.3 Client Login Protocol
A high level description of the protocol is given in Figure 1, and the formal description is given
in Appendix B. Our protocol for a client C ∈ Clients relies on a simulation-sound non-interactive
zero-knowledge proof (SS-NIZKP) scheme (see Appendix A for the deﬁnition of an SS-NIZKP
scheme) Q =( ProveΦQ,VerifyΦQ,SimΦQ) over a language deﬁned by a predicate ΦQ that takes
elements of {0,1}∗ × (Gq × Gq)3 and is deﬁned as
ΦQ(τ,EC,B,V)
def = ∃β,π,γ :
 
B =
 
yβ,gβ
 
× (EC)π × (g−1,1)
 
and (V =( hγgπ,gγ)).
The algorithms ProveΦQ, VerifyΦQ,a n dSimΦQ use a random oracle H3. ProveΦQ may be imple-
mented in a standard way as a three-move honest-veriﬁer proof made non-interactive by using the
hash function to generate the veriﬁer’s random challenge, and having τ be an extra input to the
hash function. Other proofs deﬁned below may be implemented similarly.
Here we discuss Figure 1. The client C ∈ Clients receives a set I of k servers in Servers and
initiates the protocol with that set, by broadcasting I along with its own identity C. (As stated
above, we assume aggregation and broadcast functionalities in the network for the communication
between the client and the servers, and among the servers themselves.) In return C receives nonces
from the servers in I. The client ﬁrst generates a session public key ˜ y. The client then “removes”
the password from the ciphertext EC by raising it to πC and dividing g out of the ﬁrst element
of the tuple, and reblinds the result to form B.T h e q u a n t i t y V is then formed to satisfy the
predicate ΦQ, and an SS-NIZKP σ is created to bind B, V ,˜ y, and the nonces from the servers.
This SS-NIZKP also forces the client to behave properly, and in particular allows a simulator in
the proof of security to operate correctly. (The idea is similar to the use of a second encryption to
achieve (lunchtime) chosen-ciphertext security in [35].) After verifying the SS-NIZKP, if the client
has used the password π = πC, it will be that B[1] = yβ+απ and B[2] = gβ+απ. The servers then
run DistVerify(τ,B,V)t ov e r i f yt h a tl o g g y =l o g B[2] B[1]. Eﬀectively, they are verifying (without
decryption) that B is a valid encryption of the plaintext message 1. Each server Si then computes
a session key Ki, which has also been computed by the client.
Intuitively, an honest client in this protocol does not reveal any password information since
he simply sends an encryption of 1, along with V , which is an encryption of gπC under a public
key for which no one knows the secret key. However, one must consider the case of an adversary
impersonating a client using π  = πC, and colluding with up to k − 1 dishonest servers. Here we
must rely on DistVerify(τ,B,V) to prevent leakage of information on πC. We discuss this below.
Eﬃciency For the following calculations we use the proof constructions of Appendix A. Recall
that there are k servers involved in the execution of the protocol. The protocol requires six rounds,
where each round is an exchange of messages among some of the participants. All messages are
of length proportional to the size of a group element. The client is involved in only the ﬁrst three
rounds, while the servers are involved in all rounds. The client performs 15 + k exponentiations,
and each server performs 14 + 38k exponentiations.
Remark 4.2 These costs are obviously much higher than the Ford-Kaliski scheme, but remember
that our protocol is the ﬁrst to achieve provable security (in the random oracle model). Also, the
costs may be reasonable for practical implementations with k in the range of 2 to 5.
8Remark 4.3 Our protocol does not provide forward security. To achieve forward security, each
server Si would need to generate its Diﬃe-Hellman values dynamically, instead of simply using
y 
i. Then these values would need to be certiﬁed somehow by Si to protect the client against a
man-in-the-middle attack. Details are beyond the scope of this paper.
Client C Server Si (i ∈ I)
C,I= i1,...,ik 
ci
R ← Zq
Broadcast: ci
{ci}i∈I 
˜ x,β,γ
R ← Zq
˜ y ← g˜ x
B ← (yβ,gβ) × (EC)π × (g−1,1)
V ← (hγgπ,gγ)
τ ← ˜ y,ci1,...,c ik 
σ ← ProveΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),(β,π,γ))
∀i ∈ I, ˜ yi ← (y 
i)˜ x
∀i ∈ I, Ki ← H2(I,τ,˜ yi)
B,V,˜ y,σ 
τ ← ˜ y,ci1,...,c ik 
If ¬VerifyΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),σ)
Then Abort
DistVerify(τ,B,V)
˜ yi ← ˜ yx
 
i
Ki ← H2(I,τ,˜ yi)
Figure 1: Protocol P.
4.4 The DistVerify Protocol
The DistVerify protocol takes three parameters, τ, B,a n dV , and is run by the servers {Si}i∈I to
verify that logg y =l o g B[2] B[1], i.e., B is an encryption of 1. The parameter V is used in order to
allow a proof of security. The protocol is shown in Figure 2, and uses the standard notation for
Lagrange coeﬃcients: λj,I =
 
 ∈I\{j}
− 
j−  mod q. The basic idea of the protocol is as follows. First
the servers distributively compute (y,g) ← Br × (y,g)r 
, i.e., they use the (standard) technique
which randomizes the quotient B[1]/(B[2])x if and only if it is not equal to 1. (This is basically
how we prevent leakage of password information in the case of an adversary impersonating a client
discussed above.) Then they take the second component (i.e., g) and distributively compute gx
using their shared secrets. Finally they verify that gx = y, implying (with high probability) that
B[1] = (B[2])x, and hence B is an encryption of 1.
In more detail, notice that in Step 1, when a server Si computes Bi (its own randomization
of B), it also computes auxiliary encryptions Vi, V  
i ,a n dV   
i , which use the same randomization
9value and are computed using V . Similar to V , these auxiliary encryptions are used only in order
to allow a proof of security. Finally in Step 1, an SS-NIZKP is computed to force the server to
behave properly. (Again, the idea here is similar to the use of a second encryption to achieve
(lunchtime) chosen-ciphertext security in [35]. It gives the simulator an alternate way to determine
the adversary’s behavior, and in particular, allows the simulator to compute decryption shares for
honest servers without knowing the decryption key.)
In Step 2, the pair (y,g) is computed, along with a partial computation of gx using the server’s
individual share of x. However, this partial computation value is not revealed yet. First the server
essentially proves that he knows how to perform the partial computation (i.e., that he knows his
share of x). This proof is also dependent on τ , which basically includes the important parts of the
transcripts of all servers. The value τ  is included so all uncompromised servers can agree on the
shared values they are using to compute (y,g) before revealing their partial computations, so as to
not leak any information.
In Step 3, once the server receives valid proofs from Step 2, it reveals its partial computation
of gx and proves that this computation was performed correctly.
In Step 4, once a server receives partial computations from all servers along with valid proofs,
it tests whether y = gx.
DistVerify uses an SS-NIZKP scheme R =( ProveΦR,VerifyΦR,SimΦR) over a language deﬁned
by a predicate ΦR that takes elements of Z × (Gq × Gq)6 a n di sd e ﬁ n e da s
ΦR(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i )
def = ∃ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i,γ  
i : Bi = Bri × (y,g)r 
i and
Vi =( hγigri,gγi)andV  
i =( hγ 
i(V [1])ri,gγ 
i)and
V   
i =( hγ  
i (V [2])ri,gγ  
i ).
The algorithms ProveΦR, VerifyΦR,a n dSimΦR use a random oracle H4.
DistVerify also uses an SS-NIZKP scheme S =( ProveΦS,VerifyΦS,SimΦS) over a language deﬁned
by a predicate ΦS that takes elements of Z ×{ 0,1}∗ × Gq × (Gq × Gq) and is deﬁned as
ΦS(i,τ ,C i,R i)
def = ∃ai,ζ: Ci = gai andRi =( hζ(h )ai,gζ).
The algorithms ProveΦS, VerifyΦS,a n dSimΦS use a random oracle H5.
Finally, DistVerify uses an SS-NIZKP scheme T =( ProveΦT ,VerifyΦT ,SimΦT ) over a language
deﬁned by a predicate ΦT that takes elements of Z ×{ 0,1}∗ × Gq × Gq × Gq × (Gq × Gq)a n di s
deﬁned as
ΦT (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i)
def = ∃ai,ζ: Ci = gai andCi = gai andRi =( hζ(h )ai,gζ).
The algorithms ProveΦT , VerifyΦT ,a n dSimΦT use a random oracle H6.
5 Security of the Protocol
Here we state the DDH assumption. Following that we prove that the protocol P is secure, based
on the DDH assumption.
Decision Diﬃe-Hellman. Here we formally state the DDH assumption. For full details, see [8].
Let Gq be as in Section 3, with generator g. For two values X = gx and Y = gy,l e tDH(X,Y)=gxy.
10Step 1: ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i,γ  
i
R ← Zq
Bi ← Bri × (y,g)r
 
i Vi ← (hγigri,gγi)
V  
i ← (hγ
 
i(V [1])ri,gγ
 
i) V   
i ← (hγ
  
i (V [2])ri,gγ
  
i )
σi ← ProveΦR((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ),(ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i,γ  
i ))
Broadcast (Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ,σ i)
Step 2: ∀j ∈ I \{ i} : Receive (Bj,V j,V 
j,V  
j ,σ j)
∀j ∈ I \{ i} :I f¬VerifyΦR((j,B,V,Bj,V j,V 
j,V  
j ),σ j)T h e nA b o r t
(y,g) ←
 
j∈I Bj
τ  ←  τ,B,V,Bi1,...,B ik,V i1,...,V ik 
ai ← λi,Ixi Ci ← gai ζ
R ← Zq Ri ← (hζ(h )ai,gζ)
∀j ∈ I : Cj ← (yj)λj,I
Γi ← ProveΦS((i,τ ,C i,R i),(ai,ζ))
Broadcast (Ri,Γi)
Step 3: ∀j ∈ I \{ i} : Receive (Rj,Γj)
∀j ∈ I \{ i} :I f¬VerifyΦS((j,τ ,C j,R j),Γj)T h e nA b o r t
Γ 
i ← ProveΦT ((i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i),(ai,ζ))
Broadcast (Ci,Γ 
i)
Step 4: ∀j ∈ I \{ i} : Receive (Cj,Γ 
j)
∀j ∈ I \{ i} :I f¬VerifyΦT ((j,τ ,g,Cj,C j,R j),Γ 
j)T h e nA b o r t
If Πj∈ICj  = y Then Abort
Figure 2: Protocol DistVerify(τ,B,V)f o rS e r v e rSi (i ∈ I).
Let A be an algorithm that on input (X,Y,Z) outputs “1” if it believes that Z = DH(X,Y), and
“0” otherwise. For any A running in time t,
AdvDDH
Gq (A)
def =P r
 
x,y
R ← Zq; X ← gx; Y ← gy; Z ← gxy : A(X,Y,Z)=1
 
−Pr
 
x,y,z
R ← Zq; X ← gx; Y ← gy; Z ← gz : A(X,Y,Z)=1
 
.
Let AdvDDH
Gq (t)=m a x A
 
AdvDDH
Gq (A)
 
, where the maximum is taken over all adversaries of time
complexity at most t. The DDH assumption states that for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A, AdvDDH
Gq (A) is negligible (in κ = |q|).
5.1 Protocol P
Here we prove that protocol P is secure, in the sense that an adversary attacking the system that
compromises fewer than k out of n servers cannot determine session keys with signiﬁcantly greater
advantage than that of an online dictionary attack. Recall that we consider only static compromis-
ing of servers, i.e., the adversary chooses which servers to compromise before the execution of the
system. Let texp be the time required to perform an exponentiation in Gq.
11P0 The original protocol P.
P1 T h en o n c e sa r ea s s u m e dt ob ed i s t i n c t( a n dt h u sReveal queries do not reveal
anything that could help in a Test query).
P2 The Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange between a client and an uncompromised server
is replaced with a perfect key exchange (and thus an adversary that does not
succeed in impersonating a client to an uncompromised server does not obtain
any information that could help in a Test query).
P3 Value V from a client, and values Vi,V 
i ,V  
i ,R i from uncompromised servers, are
replaced by random values. The Q-SS-NIZKP σ,a n de a c hR-SS-NIZKP σi,
S-SS-NIZKP Γi,a n dT -SS-NIZKP Γ 
i, are constructed using the associated
simulators.
P4 Value B from a client is replaced with a random encryption of 1, and authenti-
cation of an honest client is changed so that uncompromised servers compute
Ci values without using their secret shares. Also, H0(y) returns a value h
with a known discrete log.
P5 The adversary succeeds if it ever sends a V value associated with the correct
password.
P6 Abort if the adversary creates a new and valid S-SS-NIZKP or T -SS-NIZKP
associated with an uncompromised server.
P7 Value EC for each client is changed to a random value, and on any adversary
login attempt for C,t h eBi and Ci values from uncompromised servers are
replaced with random values (so as to force a failure).
Figure 3: Informal description of protocols P0 through P7
Theorem 5.1 Let P be the protocol described in Figure 1 and Figure 2, (and formally described
in Appendix B), using group Gq, and with a password dictionary of size N (that may be mapped
into Z∗
q). Fix an adversary A that runs in time t, makes nex,n re queries of type Execute,Reveal,
respectively, makes nro queries directly to the random oracles, and starts at most nin client and
server instances. Then for t  = O(t +( nro + knin + k2nex)texp):
Advdake
P (A) ≤
nin
N
+ O
 
AdvDDH
Gq (t )+
n2 + knronin + nron +( nin + knex)2
q
+
(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q2
 
.
Proof: We begin with a sketch of the proof, and later provide the details.
Sketch: Our proof will proceed by introducing a series of protocols P0,P 1,...,P 7 related to P,
with P0 = P.I nP7, A will be reduced to simply “guessing” the correct password πC. We describe
these protocols informally in Figure 3. For each i from 1 to 7, we will prove that the diﬀerence
between the advantage of A attacking protocols Pi−1 and Pi is negligible.
12P0 → P1 The probability of a collision of nonces is easily seen to be negligible.
P1 → P2 This can be shown using a standard reduction from DDH. On input (X,Y,Z), we plug
in random powers of Y for the servers’ local public keys, and random powers of X for the
clients’ ˜ y values, and then check H2 queries for appropriate powers of Z.
P2 → P3 This can be shown using a reduction from DDH. On input (X,Y,Z), we plug Y in for
h = H0(y), and we use X and Z to create (randomized) encryptions for all V , Vi, V  
i , V   
i ,
and Ri values. Also, we must factor in the negligible probability of a simulation error in one
of the SS-NIZKPs.
P3 → P4 This is straightforward, since the view of the adversary is indistinguishable in these two
protocols.
P4 → P5 This is straightforward, since this could only increase the probability of the adversary
succeeding. Below we will use the fact that the discrete log of h is known, and that the Ci
value computed when authenticating a client’s B value by an uncompromised server does not
use the secret share of that server.
P5 → P6 This can be shown using a reduction from DDH. On input (X,Y,Z), we plug Y in for y,
simulate the public shares of the uncompromised servers, and let h  = X. Given a correct
SS-NIZKP for an uncompromised server, we can compute (h )x,w h e r ey = gx (where x is not
known). Then we simply check if Z =( h )x.
There is a diﬃculty now in performing authentication on B values chosen by the adversary,
since we do not know the secret shares (the xi values) for the uncompromised servers. There-
fore to perform authentication, we use the fact that discrete log of h is known so we can
decrypt all V , Vi, V  
i ,a n dV   
i values, and then use these decryptions to aid in computing
t h ec o r r e c tv a l u eo fgx (even though we don’t know x). Finally, we generate Ci values from
uncompromised servers in such a way that the product is gx, similar to the way the Ci values
are computed by uncompromised servers for authentication of a client’s B value. Note that
the SS-NIZKPs are already being simulated.
P6 → P7 This can be shown using a reduction from DDH. On input (X,Y,Z), we plug Y in
for y, simulate the public shares of the uncompromised servers, and use X and Z to create
(randomized) encryptions for all EC values. This does not aﬀect authentication using B values
generated by clients (since these values are random encryptions of 1 at this point, anyway).
The diﬃculty is in obtaining the correct distribution of Ci values while authenticating B
values chosen by the adversary. To do this we use X and Z in our creation of the Bi values
for uncompromised servers, which leaves Ci values correct if (X,Y,Z) is a true DH triple,
but has the eﬀect of randomizing the Ci values if (X,Y,Z) is a random triple. Again, the
decryptions of V , Vi, V  
i ,a n dV   
i are used to aid in computing the true gx value (even though
we don’t know x)w h e n( X,Y,Z) is a true DH triple, or the appropriate random value, when
(X,Y,Z) is a random triple.
One can see that in P2, an adversary that does not succeed in impersonating a client to an uncom-
promised server gains negligible advantage in determining a real session key from a random session
key. The remainder of the protocols are used to show that an adversary gains negligible advantage
13in impersonating a client over a simple online guessing attack. In particular, in P7 the password is
only used to check V values submitted by the adversary attempting to impersonate a client. The
theorem follows.
Details: We use the terminology “in a Client Action i query to C”t om e a n“ i naSend or
Execute query to C that results in the Client Action i procedure being executed,” and “in a
Server Action i query to S”t om e a n“ i naSend or Execute query to S that results in the
Server Action i procedure being executed.” Details of these procedures can be found in the
formal speciﬁcation of the protocol in Appendix B.
We assume without loss of generality that k, n, nro,a n dnin+nex are all at least 1. In the following
protocols, we let J be the set of indices of compromised servers. Without loss of generality, we
assume |J| = k − 1. For each uncompromised server Si,l e tJi = {i}∪J.
Protocol P1. Let E be the event that two server keys y 
i and y 
j are the same, or that a server Si
generates the same nonce ci in Server Action 1 queries in two diﬀerent instances, or that one or
more clients generate the same ˜ y value in diﬀerent Client Action 2 queries. Let P1 be a protocol
that is identical to P0 except that if E occurs, the protocol aborts (and thus the adversary fails).
Note that if E does not occur, then it will never be the case that A makes a Reveal (C, i, Sj)
query where ΠC
i generated key ski
C,Sj = H2(I,τ,˜ yj)o raReveal (Sj,i )q u e r yw h e r eΠ
Sj
i generated
key ski
Sj = H2(I,τ,˜ yj), and there is another client or server instance that generates a key using
H2(I,τ,˜ yj) that is not a partner to the instance corresponding to the Reveal query.
Claim 5.2 For any adversary A,
Advdake
P0 (A) ≤ Advdake
P1 (A)+
O(n2 +( nin +( k +1 ) nex)2)
q
.
Proof: Straightforward.
Protocol P2. Let E be the event that A makes an H2(I,τ,˜ yi)q u e r yf o rav a l u e˜ yi = DH(˜ y,y 
i)
for some key y 
i belonging to an uncompromised server Si,a n df o rs o m e˜ y generated in a Client
Action 2 q u e r yt oac l i e n tC that generated τ.L e tP2 be a protocol that is identical to P1 except
that if E occurs, the protocol aborts (and thus the adversary fails).
Claim 5.3 For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t  = O(t +( nro + knin + k2nex)texp)
such that
Advdake
P1 (A) ≤ Advdake
P2 (A)+2 AdvDDH
Gq (t )+
O(nin + nex + nron)
q
.
Proof: Let   be the probability that E occurs when A is running against protocol P1. Then
Pr(Succdake
P1 (A)) ≤ Pr(Succdake
P2 (A)) +  , and thus by Fact 2.2, Advdake
P1 (A) ≤ Advdake
P2 (A)+2  .
Now we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and
random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X,Y,Z), D simulates
P1 for A with these changes:
141. In the initialization procedure, for each uncompromised server Si, replace the normal gener-
ation of y 
i with y 
i ← Y ρi where ρi
R ← Zq.
2. In a Client Action 2 query to a client C, replace the normal generation of ˜ y with ˜ y ← Xψ,
where ψ
R ← Zq. Then for each uncompromised server Si, replace the normal generation of Ki
with Ki
R ←{ 0,1}κ.
3. In a Server Action 6 query to an uncompromised server Si,i f˜ y was generated in a Client
Action 2 q u e r yt oac l i e n tC, replace the normal generation of K with K ← Ki for the Ki
value generated by that Client Action 2 query.
4. In an H2 query, if the query is (I,τ,Zρiψ), for I, τ,a n dψ g e n e r a t e di naClient Action 2
q u e r yt oac l i e n tC, and any ρi generated in the initialization procedure for uncompromised
server Si with i ∈ I, D outputs 1 and halts.
5. If A ﬁnishes, D outputs 0 and halts.
If (X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of DH triples, this simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from
P1 until E occurs, when the simulation halts and D outputs 1. If (X,Y,Z)i sd r a w nf r o mt h es e to f
random triples, then D outputs 1 only if A happens to query H2 with a third parameter equal to
one of the values tested in the simulation. This could happen if one of the ρi or ψ values generated
by the simulator is zero or if none of those values are zero but the Z value is such that one of the
nro queries made by the adversary to H2 has a third parameter equal to Zρiψ. Recalling that n is
the total number of servers, and thus an upper bound on the number of uncompromised servers,
the former probability is at most n+nin+nex
q , and the latter is at most nron
q ,
Let t  be the running time of D, and note that t  = O(t+(nro +knin +k2nex)texp). The advantage
of D is
AdvDDH
Gq (D)=P r [ D outputs 1|DH triple] − Pr[D outputs 1|random triple]
≥   −
n + nin + nex + nron
q
.
The claim follows from the fact that AdvDDH
Gq (D) ≤ AdvDDH
Gq (t ).
Protocol P3. Let P3 b eap r o t o c o lt h a ti si d e n t i c a lt oP2 except for the following, where Simhash
and Simprove refer to the simulated hash functions and simulated provers described in Appendix A.
1. H3 queries are answered by SimhashΦQ, and in a Client Action 2 query to client C,
V
R ← Gq × Gq and σ is constructed using SimproveΦQ.
2. H4 queries are answered by SimhashΦR, and in a Server Action 3 query to an uncompro-
mised server Si, Vi,V 
i ,V  
i
R ← Gq × Gq and σi is constructed using SimproveΦR.
3. H5 queries are answered by SimhashΦS, and in a Server Action 4 query to an uncompro-
mised server Si, Ri
R ← Gq × Gq and Γi is constructed using SimproveΦS.
154. H6 queries are answered by SimhashΦT , and in a Server Action 5 query to an uncompro-
mised server Si,Γ  
i is constructed using SimproveΦT .
If SimproveΦQ, SimproveΦR, SimproveΦS,o rSimproveΦT fails, P3 aborts.
Claim 5.4 For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t  = O(t +( nro + knin + k2nex)texp)
such that
Advdake
P2 (A) ≤ Advdake
P3 (A)+2 AdvDDH
Gq (t )+
2
q
+
O((nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex))
q2 .
Proof: Assume Advdake
P2 (A)=Advdake
P3 (A)+2 , and thus by Fact 2.2, Pr(Succdake
P2 (A)) = Pr(Succdake
P3 (A))+
 .
Now we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and
random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X,Y,Z), D simulates
P3 for A with the following changes:
1. A query H0(y) returns Y . (Recall that h = H0(y).)
2. In a Client Action 2 query to a client C, V ← (Zµ1Y µ2gπC,Xµ1gµ2), where µ1,µ 2
R ← Zq.
Also, if SimproveΦQ fails, D outputs 0 and halts.
3. In a Server Action 3 query to an uncompromised server Si using parameters (B,V),
Vi ← (Zµ1Y µ2gri,Xµ1gµ2)
V  
i ← (Zµ 
1Y µ 
2(V [1])ri,Xµ 
1gµ 
2), and
V   
i ← (Zµ  
1Y µ  
2(V [2])ri,Xµ  
1gµ  
2)
where µ1,µ 2,µ  
1,µ  
2,µ   
1,µ   
2
R ← Zq. Also, if SimproveΦR fails, D outputs 0 and halts.
4. In a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised server Si
Ri ← (Zµ1Y µ2(h )ai,Xµ1gµ2)
where µ1,µ 2
R ← Zq. Also, if SimproveΦS fails, D outputs 0 and halts.
5. In a Server Action 5 query to an uncompromised server Si,i fSimproveΦT fails, D outputs
0 and halts.
6. If A succeeds against this simulation, D outputs 1 and halts, else D outputs 0 and halts.
When (X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of DH triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable
from P2, with diﬀerence at most
SimerrQ(nro,n in + nex)+SimerrR(nro,n in + knex)+
SimerrS(nro,n in + knex)+SimerrT (nro,n in + knex)
16≤
(nin + nex)(nro + nin + nex)
q3 +
(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q5 +
(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q2 +
(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q2
≤
4(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q2 .
When (X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of random triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguish-
able from P3, the statistical diﬀerence coming from the 1
q probability that (X,Y,Z) is actually a
DH triple.
Let t  be the running time for D, and note that t  = O(t+(nro+knin+k2nex)texp). The advantage
of D is
AdvDDH
Gq (D)=P r [ D outputs 1|DH triple] − Pr[D outputs 1|random triple]
≥ Pr
 
Succdake
P2 (A)
 
−
4(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q2 − Pr
 
Succdake
P3 (A)
 
−
1
q
=   −
1
q
−
4(nin + knex)(nro + nin + knex)
q2 ,
The claim follows from the fact that AdvDDH
Gq (D) ≤ AdvDDH
Gq (t ).
Simulation Soundness. We will deﬁne Fraud as the event that the adversary is able to produce
a new valid SS-NIZKP (of one of the four types used in the protocol) for a statement that does
not satisfy the particular relation corresponding to that type of SS-NIZKP. Formally, let E1 be the
event that A sends a valid Q-SS-NIZKP σ in a Server Action 3 query for a string (τ,EC,B,V)
not previously used in a Client Action 2 query to client C, where (τ,EC,B,V) does not satisfy
ΦQ.L e tE2 be the event that A sends a valid R-SS-NIZKP σi for a server Si in a Server Action 4
query to any server Sj for a string (i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ) not previously used in a Server Action 3
query to server Si, where (i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ) does not satisfy ΦR.L e tE3 be the event that A
sends a valid S-SS-NIZKP Γi for a server Si in a Server Action 5 query to any server Sj for a
string (i,τ ,C i,R i)t h a tw a sn o tp r e v i o u s l yu s e di naServer Action 4 query to server Si,w h e r e
(i,τ ,C i,R i) does not satisfy ΦS.L e tE4 be the event that A sends a valid T -SS-NIZKP Γ 
i for a
server Si in a Server Action 6 query to any server Sj for a string (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i)t h a tw a s
not previously used in a Server Action 5 query to server Si, where (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i)d o e sn o t
satisfy ΦT .
Let Fraud = E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3 ∨ E4.
Claim 5.5 For any adversary A running against P3,
Pr(Fraud) ≤
4knin(nro +1 )
q
.
Proof: We split the proof into four parts.
17Part 1 Let   be the probability that E1 occurs when A is running against protocol P3.W ec o n -
struct an algorithm D that simulates P3 with the following change: D guesses which Server Action 3
query will cause E1 to occur, and on that query D outputs the pair ((τ,EC,B,V),σ) associated
with that query and halts. The simulation is indistinguishable from P3 until D halts. D outputs a
valid Q-SS-NIZKP σ for a string (τ,EC,B,V) that does not satisfy ΦQ with probability  
nin. This
implies SerrQ(nro,n in + nex) ≥  
nin,w h e r eSerrQ(nro,n pr) is the soundness error of the Q-SS-
NIZKP protocol from Appendix A given nro random oracle queries and npr proof queries. For this
protocol SerrQ(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q ,s oP r ( E1) ≤
nin(nro+1)
q .
Part 2 In a similar way, we can show that Pr(E2) ≤
knin(nro+1)
q . The extra factor of k comes
from the fact that D must guess which of the k proofs in a Server Action 4 query cause E2 to
occur.
Part 3 Similar to Part 2, we can show that Pr(E3) ≤
knin(nro+1)
q .
Part 4 Similar to Part 3, we can show that Pr(E4) ≤
knin(nro+1)
q .
In the following proofs we will not use Claim 5.5 directly, but instead use the fact that the bound
on Pr(Fraud) in Claim 5.5 applies to any of the protocols and simulations that we create from this
point forward. This is easy to see, since the simulator does not actually do anything but run the
protocol and stop at some point to guess a fraudulent proof.
Protocol P4. Let P4 be a protocol that is identical to P3 except for the following.
1. In initialization, ρ
R ← Zq is generated, and for y generated in initialization, H0(y) returns gρ.
(Recall that h = H0(y).)
2. In a Client Action 2 q u e r yt oac l i e n tC, B ← (yβ,gβ).
3. In a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised server Si that uses a B value (re-
ceived in its associated Server Action 3 query) produced in a Client Action 2 query,
Ci ←
 
y
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 λi,I/λi,Ji
. Note that this computation does not rely on the secret
shares of uncompromised servers.
Claim 5.6 For any adversary A,
Advdake
P3 (A) ≤ Advdake
P4 (A)+
O(kninnro)
q
.
Proof: We show that if Fraud does not occur, P4 is perfectly indistinguishable from P3.F o rt h i s
we simply need to show that in a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised server Si that
uses a B value produced in a Client Action 2 query, the Ci value computed in P4 and P3 will
18be the same, as long as Fraud does not occur. To see this, note that in this case, y = gx implies
y = gx, and thus
C
 P4 
i =

y


 
j∈J
gλj,Jixj


−1

λi,I/λi,Ji
=

gx


 
j∈J
gλj,Jixj


−1

λi,I/λi,Ji
=
 
gλi,Jixi
 λi,I/λi,Ji
= gλi,Ixi
= C
 P3 
i .
Now let   be the probability that Fraud occurs in P3.T h e nP r ( Succdake
P3 (A)) ≤ Pr(Succdake
P4 (A))+ ,
and thus by Fact 2.2, Advdake
P3 (A) ≤ Advdake
P4 (A)+2  . The claim follows from the fact that   ≤
4knin(nro+1)
q .
Protocol P5. Let P5 be a protocol that is identical to P4 except that in a Server Action 3
query to a server Si, for a client C, and using parameters (τ,EC,B,V), where (τ,EC,B,V)w a s
never used in a Client Action 2 query to client C,i fV [1]/(V [2])ρ = gπC, P5 stops and we say
that A succeeds.
Claim 5.7 For any adversary A,
Advdake
P4 (A) ≤ Advdake
P5 (A)
Proof: By having P5 stop and saying that A succeeds, we could only increase the probability of
success of A.
Protocol P6. Let E1 be the event that A sends a valid S-SS-NIZKP Γi for an uncompromised
server Si in a Server Action 5 query to any server Sj for a string (i,τ ,C i,R i) that was not
previously used in a Server Action 4 query to server Si.
Let E2 be the event that A sends a valid T -SS-NIZKP Γ 
i for an uncompromised server Si in a
Server Action 6 query to any server Sj for a string (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i) that was not previously
used in a Server Action 5 query to server Si.
Let E = E1 ∨E2.L e tP6 be a protocol that is identical to P5 except that if E occurs, P6 halts and
A fails.
Claim 5.8 For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t  = O(t +( nro + knin + k2nex)texp)
such that
Advdake
P5 (A) ≤ Advdake
P6 (A)+2 AdvDDH
Gq (t )+
O(kninnro)
q
.
19Proof: Let   be the probability that E occurs in P5.T h e nP r ( Succdake
P5 (A)) ≤ Pr(Succdake
P6 (A))+ ,
and thus by Fact 2.2, Advdake
P5 (A) ≤ Advdake
P6 (A)+2  .
The intuition behind this proof is that if E occurs, then the adversary must somehow have com-
puted h  raised to the secret share of the uncompromised server. This essentially implies that
the adversary performs a Diﬃe-Hellman computation on h  and the public key y. However, in a
reduction argument from DDH, there is a diﬃculty when trying to simulate the protocol (and in
particular the Ci values from uncompromised servers), since we do not know the secret shares of
the uncompromised servers. Fortunately, the auxiliary values (i.e., V and the Vj, V  
j,a n dV   
j values
from the other servers) give us enough information to simulate the Ci values.
Formally, we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and
random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X,Y,Z), D simulates
P5 for A with these changes:
1. In the initialization procedure, y ← Y and H1(y) ← X. (Recall that h  = H1(y).) For each
i ∈ J, xi
R ← Zq, and for each uncompromised server Si, yi ←
 
y
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 1/λi,Ji
.
2. In a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised server Si that does not use a value B
produced in a Client Action 2 query to a client, do the following:
(a) Let IB ⊆ I be the set of indices where for j ∈ IB, the tuple (Bj,V j,V 
j,V  
j ) was not
produced by server Sj, and let IG = I \ IB. Use the B,V,{j,Bj,V j,V 
j,V  
j }j∈I values
known to Si to perform the following computation, where sρ(V )=V [1]/(V [2])ρ.
y∗ ←


 
j∈IG
Bj[1]grj(sρ(V ))−rj/πC




 
j∈IB
Bj[1]sρ(Vj)
 
sρ((sρ(V  
j),s ρ(V   
j )))
 −1/πC

.
(b) Set Ci ←
 
y∗
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 λi,I/λi,Ji
.
3. In a Server Action 5 query to an uncompromised server, if there is a tuple (Ri,Γi) that
was not produced by server Si, Si is not compromised, and Γi is valid, then perform the
following computation, where sρ(V )=V [1]/(V [2])ρ.
Z∗ ← (sρ(Ri))λi,Ji(λi,I)−1


 
j∈J
Xλj,Jixj

.
If Z = Z∗, D halts and outputs 1, else D halts and outputs 0.
4. In a Server Action 6 query to an uncompromised server, If there is a tuple (Ci,R i,Γ 
i)
that was not produced by server Si, Si is not compromised, and Γ 
i is valid, then perform the
following computation, where sρ(V )=V [1]/(V [2])ρ.
Z∗ ← (sρ(Ri))λi,Ji(λi,I)−1


 
j∈J
Xλj,Jixj

.
20If Z = Z∗, D halts and outputs 1, else D halts and outputs 0.
5. If A halts, D halts and outputs 0.
First we show that if Fraud does not occur, then in a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised
server Si that does not use a value B computed in a Client Action 2 q u e r yt oac l i e n t ,y∗ = gx,
where y = gx. (Note that x is not necessarily known to D.) Say B is veriﬁed against client C.
Without loss of generality, we may assume
EC =( yαg(πC)−1
,gα),
B =( y,g)β × (EC)π × (g−1,1) = (yβ+απgπ(πC)−1−1,gβ+απ),
V =( hγgπ,gγ),
Bj = Brj × (y,g)
r 
j =( y
(β+απ)rj+r 
jgrj(π(πC)−1−1),g
(β+απ)rj+r 
j), and
g =
 
j∈I
Bj[2] =
 
j∈I
g
(β+απ)rj+r 
j = g
(β+απ)(
 
j∈I rj)+(
 
j∈I r 
j),
for some β,π,γ,{rj}j∈I,{r 
j}j∈I ∈ Zq.F o r j ∈ IB, we may also assume Vj =( hγjgrj,gγj), V  
j =
(h
γ 
j(V [1])rj,g
γ 
j), and V   
j =( h
γ  
j (V [2])rj,g
γ  
j ), for some γj,γ 
j,γ  
j ∈ Zq.T h e ns i n c eh = gρ, sρ(V )=
gπ, and for j ∈ IB, sρ(Vj)=grj, sρ(V  
j)=( V [1])rj, sρ(V   
j )=( V [2])rj and sρ((sρ(V  
j),s ρ(V   
j ))) =
grjπ.
Thus
y∗ =


 
j∈IG
Bj[1]grj(sρ(V ))−rj/πC




 
j∈IB
Bj[1]sρ(Vj)
 
sρ((sρ(V  
j),s ρ(V   
j )))
 −1/πC


=


 
j∈IG
Bj[1]grj
 
g−rjπ(πC)−1 




 
j∈IB
Bj[1]grj
 
g−rjπ(πC)−1 


=
 
j∈I
Bj[1]grj(1−π(πC)−1)
=
 
j∈I
 
y
(β+απ)rj+r 
jgrj(π(πC)−1−1)
 
grj(1−π(πC)−1)
=
 
j∈I
y
(β+απ)rj+r 
j
= y
(β+απ)(
 
j∈I rj)+(
 
j∈I r 
j)
= gx.
Thus as long as Fraud does not occur, the simulation of the Server Action 4 query is perfectly
indistinguishable from the real Server Action 4 query in either P5 or P6.
Also as long as Fraud does not occur, when (X,Y,Z) is a DH triple, then in both computations of
21Z∗ above,
Z∗ =( sρ(Ri))λi,Ji(λi,I)−1


 
j∈J
Xλj,Jixj


=( Xλi,Ixi)λi,Ji(λi,I)−1


 
j∈J
Xλj,Jixj


= Xλi,Jixi


 
j∈J
Xλj,Jixj


=
 
j∈Ji
Xλj,Jixj
= Xx
where yi = gxi and y = gx,w h e r ex and xi are not necessarily known to D.T h u sZ∗ = DH(X,Y).
When (X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of DH triples, the simulation is statistically indistinguishable
from P5 until E occurs, the statistical diﬀerence coming from the probability that Fraud occurs.
When E occurs, D outputs 1. When (X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of random triples, the
simulation is statistically indistinguishable from P5, the statistical diﬀerence coming from (1) the
probability that Fraud occurs, and (2) the probability that Fraud does not occur but D halts and
outputs 1, which is at most knin
q ,s i n c eZ is random.
Let t  be the running time for D, and note that t  = O(t+(nro+knin+k2nex)texp). The advantage
of D is
AdvDDH
Gq (D)=P r [ D outputs 1|DH triple] − Pr[D outputs 1|random triple]
≥   −
4knin(nro +1 )
q
−
knin
q
−
4knin(nro +1 )
q
.
The claim follows from the fact that AdvDDH
Gq (D) ≤ AdvDDH
Gq (t ).
Protocol P7. Let P7 be a protocol that is identical to P6 except for the following.
1. In initialization, for each C ∈ Clients, EC
R ← Gq × Gq.
2. In a Server Action 3 query to an uncompromised server Si that uses a value B not used
in any Client Action 2 query, Bi
R ← Gq × Gq.
3. In a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised server Si that uses a value B not used
in any Client Action 2 query, and that uses a τ  value, compute Ci as follows. If there is
a( y∗,τ ) pair recorded for this τ , use that y∗, else choose y∗ R ← Gq, and record (y∗,τ ). Then
Ci ←
 
y∗
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 λi,I/λi,Ji
. (The intuition behind this is that with a random y∗,
A will fail with high probability, as it should.)
22Claim 5.9 For any adversary A running in time t, there is a t  = O(t +( nro + knin + k2nex)texp)
such that
Advdake
P6 (A) ≤ Advdake
P7 (A)+2 AdvDDH
Gq (t )+
O(kninnro +1 )
q
.
Proof: Assume Advdake
P6 (A)=Advdake
P7 (A)+2 , and thus by Fact 2.2, Pr(Succdake
P6 (A)) = Pr(Succdake
P7 (A))+
 .
For the intuition behind this proof, consider if P7 was simply P6 with EC computed randomly.
(Indeed this would remove the last password dependency from the protocol, which was our original
goal.) Then we would try to show that if the adversary can distinguish the two protocols (P6 and
P7), then the adversary can break the (semantic security of) encryption EC, and hence DDH. This
could be proven using a straightforward reduction from DDH except for the fact that we need to
simulate Ci values from uncompromised servers who receive B values generated by the adversary.
The method in the previous proof cannot be used directly, since it depends explicitly on EC being
valid. To solve this problem, in P7 we also randomize the Bi values from uncompromised servers,
and we compute Ci values as in the method in the previous proof, but using a randomly chosen
y∗ value. Our reduction from DDH will then be set up so that the Bi values from uncompromised
servers are aﬀected in the same way as EC, i.e., they are computed honestly for valid Diﬃe-Hellman
triples, but are random for random triples. Similarly, the y∗ values are computed honestly (i.e.,
y∗ = gx as in the previous proof) for valid Diﬃe-Hellman triples, but are random for random triples
(and in particular, are not dependent on the correct form of EC). Putting this all together, we
show that we can perform the simulation in the reduction from DDH, and thus we show that if the
adversary can distinguish the two protocols, then DDH can be broken.
Formally, we construct an algorithm D that attempts to distinguish between valid DH triples and
random triples by running A on a simulation of the protocol. Given triple (X,Y,Z), D simulates
P7 for A with these changes:
1. In the initialization procedure, y ← Y .F o re a c hi ∈ J, xi
R ← Zq, and for each uncompromised
server Si, yi ←
 
y
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 1/λi,Ji
.
2. In the initialization of a client C, EC ← (Zµ1Y µ2g(πC)−1
,Xµ1gµ2)f o rµ1,µ 2
R ← Zq.
3. In a Server Action 3 query to an uncompromised server Si that does not use a value B
computed in a Client Action 2 query to a client, D computes Bi ← Bri×(y,g)r 
i×(Z,X)r  
i ,
for ri,r 
i,r  
i
R ← Zq.
4. In a Server Action 4 query to an uncompromised server Si that does not use a value B
produced in a Client Action 2 query to a client, do the following:
(a) Let IB ⊆ I be the set of indices where for j ∈ IB, the tuple (Bj,V j,V 
j,V  
j ) was not
produced by server Sj, and let IG = I \ IB. Use the B,V,{j,Bj,V j,V 
j,V  
j }j∈I values
23known to Si to perform the following computation, where sρ(V )=V [1]/(V [2])ρ.
y∗ ←


 
j∈IG
Bj[1]grj(sρ(V ))−rj/πC




 
j∈IB
Bj[1]sρ(Vj)
 
sρ((sρ(V  
j),s ρ(V   
j )))
 −1/πC

.
(b) Set Ci ←
 
y∗
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 λi,I/λi,Ji
.
5. If A succeeds against this simulation, D outputs 1 and halts, else D outputs 0 and halts.
Similar to the proof of Claim 5.8, if Fraud does not occur, when (X,Y,Z) is a DH triple, y∗ =
gx,w h e r ey = gx.T h u s , w h e n ( X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of DH triples, the simulation is
statistically indistinguishable from P6, the statistical diﬀerence coming from the probability that
Fraud occurs. When (X,Y,Z) is drawn from the set of random triples, the simulation is statistically
indistinguishable from P7, the statistical diﬀerence coming from the 1
q probability that (X,Y,Z)i s
actually a DH triple, and the probability that Fraud occurs.
To see this, consider a non-DH triple (X,Y,Z), and assume Fraud does not occur. Then obviously
the distribution of EC is the same. Consider a (τ,B,V) tuple sent by A to a set of servers I.T h e
distribution of the Bi value produced by an uncompromised server Si will be the same as in P7,
i.e., in both Bi will be random in Gq × Gq.
We are left to show that the distribution of y∗ values produced in P7 and the simulation are the
same. In particular, we need to show that the y∗ value produced in the simulation for a given τ  is
the same for each uncompromised server using τ , is randomly distributed and, if a corresponding
Ci value is revealed, is independent from any y∗ value produced in the simulation for any other τ  at
any uncompromised server.8 We argue this as follows. In the simulation, in any Server Action 4
query to an uncompromised server using a given τ ,t h ey∗ value will be ﬁxed. This is because (1)
τ  determines τ, and no τ is ever duplicated (see P1), implying that each rj value for j ∈ IG can be
determined by examining the Server Action 3 query to the instance of Sj corresponding to τ,
(2) τ  determines V ,( 3 )τ  determines each Bj and Vj, and for j ∈ IB,s i n c eFraud does not occur
(speciﬁcally, for an R-SS-NIZKP not produced in a Server Action 3 query to server Sj), this
ﬁxes sρ(Vj)
 
sρ((sρ(V  
j),s ρ(V   
j )))
 −1/πC
.T os e et h a ty∗ is random (and in particular, independent
of y), simply notice that the y∗ value includes a random factor. Speciﬁcally, for an uncompromised
server Si, it includes the factor gri(sρ(V ))−(πC)−1ri,w h e r esρ(V )  = gπC (see P5) which implies this
factor is of the form (g )ri,w h e r eg  ∈ Gq and g   = 1. But one can see that for a given Bi, all values
of ri are equally likely (since logX Z  =l o g g y), so (g )ri is random.
Note that the above argument implies that the y∗ value computed by Si using τ  is independent
from any other y∗ produced by Si, since the random factor ri would be independent. Now we claim
that if any Ci is revealed for a given τ  (say τ 
1)t h ey∗ value computed by Si will be independent of
any y∗ computed at any other uncompromised server Sj for a diﬀerent τ  (say τ 
2). This is basically
because the adversary could not produce a valid S-SS-NIZKP Γj for an uncompromised server Sj,
8Note that y
∗ is only used in computing Ci,a n di fCi is not revealed, then the distribution of y
∗ is irrelevant to
the behavior of the adversary.
24and a valid Γj for τ 
1 from every other server is required for Si to reveal its Ci value. So if Ci
is revealed, then all uncompromised servers in I must have run Server Action 4 using τ 
1.T h e
claim follows by noting that a y∗ value computed at an uncompromised server Sj for τ 
2  = τ 
1 would
be independent from the y∗ value computed at Sj using τ 
1, by the original argument about the
independence of y∗ values computed at the same server.
Let t  be the running time for D, and note that t  = O(t+(nro+knin+k2nex)texp). The advantage
of D is
AdvDDH
Gq (D)=P r [ D outputs 1|DH triple] − Pr[D outputs 1|random triple]
≥ Pr
 
Succdake
P6 (A)
 
−
4knin(nro +1 )
q
− Pr
 
Succdake
P7 (A)
 
−
1
q
−
4knin(nro +1 )
q
=   −
1
q
−
8knin(nro +1 )
q
.
The claim follows from the fact that AdvDDH
Gq (D) ≤ AdvDDH
Gq (t ).
Now we show that in P7, unless Fraud occurs, an uncompromised server will accept exactly those
tuples (τ,B,V) generated by a client (except with probability nin
q ), and thus P7 gives no information
about πC except for testing for it (as deﬁned in P5)i naServer Action 3 query that does not
come from a client.
Assume Fraud does not occur. Then say (τ,B,V) is generated by a client. An uncompro-
mised server Si accepts by testing that
 
i∈I Ci = y. But since Fraud does not occur, every
Ci produced by A (with a valid Γ 
i) satisﬁes Ci = gλi,Ixi,a n db yP6, it comes from a com-
promised server. Furthermore, by P4,e v e r yCi produced by an uncompromised server satisﬁes
Ci =
 
y
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 λi,I/λi,Ji
. As in the proof of Claim 5.6, Ci = gλi,Ixi,w h e r e{xi}i∈{1,...,n}
is the (k,n)-threshold sharing of the discrete log of y over base g, with the ﬁxed values {xj}j∈J,
where J is the set of k−1 compromised servers. Note that we do not necessarily know xi for i  ∈ J.
Now let IB = I ∩ J and IG = I \ IB. Then
 
i∈I
Ci =
 
i∈IB
gλi,Ixi
 
i∈IG
gλi,Ixi
=
 
i∈I
gλi,Ixi
= y.
Thus the tuple (τ,B,V) would be accepted.
Again assume Fraud does not occur. Then say (τ,B,V) is generated by A. Again an uncompromised
server Si accepts by testing that
 
i∈I Ci = y.A l s o e v e r y Ci produced by A (with a valid Γ 
i)
satisﬁes Ci = gλi,Ixi and comes from a compromised server. But now every Ci produced by an
uncompromised server satisﬁes Ci =
 
y∗
  
j∈J gλj,Jixj
 −1 λi,I/λj,Ji
, for a random y∗ (associated
with the τ  value used by these servers), independent of y.L e t{xi}i∈{1,...,n} be a (k,n)-threshold
sharing of the discrete log of y∗ over base g, such that xi = xi for i ∈ J,w h e r eJ is the set of k −1
compromised servers. Note that we do not necessarily know xi for i  ∈ J.
25Now let IB = I ∩ J and IG = I \ IB. Then
 
i∈I
Ci =
 
i∈IB
gλi,Ixi
 
i∈IG

y∗


 
j∈J
gλj,Jixj


−1

λi,I/λi,Ji
=
 
i∈IB
gλi,Ixi
 
i∈IG
 
gλi,Jixi
 λi,I/λi,Ji
=
 
i∈IB
gλi,Ixi
 
i∈IG
gλi,Ixi
=
 
i∈IB
gλi,Ixi
 
i∈IG
gλi,Ixi
=
 
i∈I
gλi,Ixi
= y∗.
Thus the tuple (τ,B,V) would be rejected unless y∗ = y, which occurs with probability 1
q.
Let E be the event that Fraud occurs, A succeeds in a password guess (as deﬁned in P5), or y∗ = y
for some random y∗ as above.
Pr
 
Succdake
P7 (A)
 
≤ Pr[E]+P r
 
Succdake
P7 (A)|¬E
 
(1 − Pr[E])
≤ Pr[E]+
1
2
(1 − Pr[E])
=
1
2
+
Pr(E)
2
≤
1
2
+
nin
2N
+
nin
2q
+
2knin(nro +1 )
q
.
which implies
Advdake
P7 (A) ≤
nin
N
+
nin
q
+
4knin(nro +1 )
q
.
The theorem follows from this fact, along with claims 5.2 through 5.9.
References
[1] M. Bellare, D. Pointcheval, and P. Rogaway. Authenticated key exchange secure against dic-
tionary attacks. In EUROCRYPT 2000 (LNCS 1807), pp. 139–155, 2000.
[2] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Random oracles are practical: A paradigm for designing eﬃcient
protocols. In 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 62–73,
November 1993.
[3] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Entity authentication and key distribution. In CRYPTO ’93
(LNCS 773), pp. 232–249, 1993.
26[4] M. Bellare and P. Rogaway. Provably secure session key distribution—the three party case. In
27th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 57–66, 1995.
[5] S. M. Bellovin and M. Merritt. Encrypted key exchange: Password-based protocols secure
against dictionary attacks. In IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages
72–84, 1992.
[6] S. M. Bellovin and M. Merritt. Augmented encrypted key exchange: A password-based pro-
tocol secure against dictionary attacks and password ﬁle compromise. In ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, pp. 244–250, 1993.
[7] M. Blum, P. Feldman and S. Micali. Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications. In
20th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 103–112, 1988.
[8] D. Boneh. The decision Diﬃe-Hellman problem. In Proceedings of the Third Algorithmic Num-
ber Theory Symposium (LNCS 1423), pp. 48–63, 1998.
[9] C. Boyd. Digital multisignatures. In H. J. Beker and F. C. Piper, editors, Cryptography and
Coding, pages 241–246. Clarendon Press, 1986.
[10] V. Boyko, P. MacKenzie, and S. Patel. Provably secure password authentication and key
exchange using Diﬃe-Hellman. In EUROCRYPT 2000 (LNCS 1807), pp. 156–171, 2000.
[11] R. Canetti, O. Goldreich, and S. Halevi. The random oracle methodology, revisited. In 30th
ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 209–218, 1998.
[12] R. Canetti, Y. Lindell, R. Ostrovsky, and A. Sahai. Universally composable two-party compu-
tation. In 34th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 2002.
[13] R. Cramer, I. Damg˚ ard, and B. Schoenmakers. Proofs of partial knowledge and simpliﬁed
design of witness hiding protocols. In Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO ’94 (LNCS 839),
pages 174–187, 1994.
[14] Y. Desmedt and Y. Frankel. Threshold cryptosystems. In CRYPTO ’89 (LNCS 435), pages
307–315, 1989.
[15] A. De Santis, G. Di Crescenzo, R. Ostrovsky, G. Persiano and A. Sahai. Robust non-interactive
zero knowledge. In CRYPTO 2001 (LNCS 2139), pp. 566–598, 2001.
[16] T. Dierks and C. Allen. The TLS protocol, version 1.0, IETF RFC 2246, January 1999.
[17] W. Diﬃe and M. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Info. Theory,
22(6):644–654, 1976.
[18] M. Di Raimondo and R. Gennaro. Provably secure threshold password-authenticated key
exchange. In EUROCRYPT ’03 (LNCS 2656), pp. 507–523, 2003. Final version available:
http://www.marioland.it/papers/tpassword.pdf.
[19] T. ElGamal. A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithm.
IEEE Trans. Info. Theory, 31:469–472, 1985.
27[20] P. Feldman. A practical scheme for non-interactive veriﬁable secret sharing. In 28th IEEE
Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 427-437, 1987
[21] A. Fiat and A. Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identiﬁcation and signa-
ture problems. In CRYPTO ’86, pp. 186–194, 1986.
[22] W. Ford and B. S. Kaliski, Jr. Server-assisted generation of a strong secret from a password.
In Proceedings of the 5th IEEE International Workshop on Enterprise Security, 2000.
[23] Y. Frankel, P. MacKenzie, and M. Yung. Adaptively-secure distributed threshold public key
systems. In European Symposium on Algorithms (LNCS 1643), pp. 4–27, 1999.
[24] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. The (in)security of distributed key gen-
eration in dlog-based cryptosystems. In EUROCRYPT ’99 (LNCS 1592), pp. 295–310, 1999.
[25] R. Gennaro, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and T. Rabin. Robust threshold DSS signatures. In
EUROCRYPT ’96 (LNCS 1070), pages 354–371, 1996.
[26] O. Goldreich and Y. Lindell. Session-key generation using human passwords only. In CRYPTO
2001 (LNCS 2139), pp. 408–432, 2001.
[27] O. Goldreich, S. Micali, and A. Wigderson. How to play any mental game – a completeness
theorem for protocols with honest majority. In 19th ACM Symposium on the Theory of Com-
puting, pp. 218–229, 1987.
[28] S. Halevi and H. Krawczyk. Public-key cryptography and password protocols. ACM Transac-
tions on Information and Systems Security, 2(3): 230–268, 1999.
[29] A. Herzberg, M. Jakobsson, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung. Proactive public-key and
signature schemes. In 3rd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp.
100–110, 1996.
[30] A. Herzberg, S. Jarecki, H. Krawczyk, and M. Yung. Proactive secret sharing, or: How to
cope with perpetual leakage. In Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO ’95, volume 963 of Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 339–352. Springer-Verlag, 27–31 Aug. 1995.
[31] D. Jablon. Strong password-only authenticated key exchange. ACM Computer Communication
Review, ACM SIGCOMM, 26(5):5–20, 1996.
[32] D. Jablon. Password authentication using multiple servers. In RSA Conference 2001, Cryptog-
raphers’ Track (LNCS 2020), pp. 344–360, 2001.
[33] J. Katz, R. Ostrovsky, and M. Yung. Eﬃcient password-authenticated key exchange using
human-memorable passwords. In EUROCRYPT 2001 (LNCS 2045), pp. 475–494, 2001.
[34] P. MacKenzie, S. Patel, and R. Swaminathan. Password authenticated key exchange based on
RSA. In ASIACRYPT 2000, (LNCS 1976), pp. 599–613, 2000.
[35] M. Naor and M. Yung. Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext
attacks. In 22nd ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pp. 427–437, 1990.
28[36] A. Sahai. Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosen-ciphertext secu-
rity. In 40th IEEE Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 543–553, 1999.
[37] SSH communications security. http://www.ssh.fi, 2001.
[38] T. Wu. The secure remote password protocol. In Proceedings of the 1998 Internet Society
Network and Distributed System Security Symposium, pp. 97–111, 1998.
A Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
Our protocols employ a variety of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs [7]. Here we deﬁne
their security under the random oracle assumption. Our deﬁnition for NIZK proofs is based on [15],
which in turn is based on [36]. In particular, we show that our NIZK proofs satisfy simulation-
soundness, which turns out to be necessary for the security of our main protocol. Our proof
constructions in Sections A.1 through A.4 are based on standard techniques from Cramer et al. [13]
and Fiat and Shamir [21].
For a relation R,l e tLR = {w :( w,v) ∈ R} be the language deﬁned by the relation. For any
NP language L, note that there is a natural witness relation R containing pairs (w,v)w h e r ev is
the witness for the membership of w in L,a n dt h a tLR = L. Recall that κ is a security parameter.
Recall Ω is the set of all hash functions. In this section we will assume all H ∈ Ω have a range of
{0,1}κ.9
• Zero-knowledge proofs: A simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system
(SS-NIZKP system) for an NP language L, with witness relation R, is a tuple (P,V,Sim),
where P is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, V is a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm, and Sim is a probabilistic polynomial-time protocol for answering both hash queries
and prove queries,10 denoted by Simhash and Simprove, respectively, satisfying:
1. Completeness: For all (w,v) ∈ R, for all H ∈ Ω, VH(w,PH(w,v)) returns true.
2. Simulation-soundness: There is a negligible function Serr(κ,nro,n pr)( soundness error)
such that for all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A that make at
most nro hash queries and npr prove queries, Pr[ExptSim
A (κ)] ≤ Serr(κ,nro,n pr), where
experiment ExptSim
A (κ)i sd e ﬁ n e da sf o l l o w s :
ExptSim
A (κ):
(w,σ) ←A Simhash,Simprove(·)(1κ)
Let Q be the list of proofs11 given by Simprove
Return true iﬀ (σ  ∈ Qandw  ∈ LandVSimhash(w,σ)=true)
If this experiment returns true for a certain σ,w ec a l lσ a fraudulent proof.
9For our proofs we will actually be working in the group Gq and we will assume the range of all H ∈ Ωi sZq.A s
discussed previously, this assumption is justiﬁed in [2].
10Prove queries take a string w as input and produce a proof that there is a v such that (w,v) ∈ R. In general,
one cannot guarantee that such a query could be answered. However, if the hash function is also being simulated,
then it will be possible to answer these queries, at least in our constructions. While this is not the most general way
to deﬁne SS-NIZKP, it is suﬃcient for our purposes.
293. (Unbounded) Zero-knowledge: There is a negligible function Simerr(κ,nro,n pr)( simula-
tion error) such that maxA |Pr[ExptA(κ)=1 ] −Pr[Expt 
A(κ)=1 ] |≤Simerr(κ,nro,n pr),
where the maximum is over all non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries
A that make at most nro hash queries and npr prove queries, and where experiments
ExptA(κ)a n dExpt 
A(κ) are deﬁned as follows:
ExptA(κ): Expt 
A(κ):
H
R ← Ω ASimhash,Sim (·,·)(1κ)
AH,PH(·,·)(1κ)
where Sim (w,v)
def = Simprove(w)f o r( w,v) ∈ R.( I f ( w,v)  ∈ R, we may assume that
both PH(w,v)a n dSim (w,v)a b o r t . )
Remark A.1 Using the zero-knowledge condition, one can see that Simhash must be computa-
tionally indistinguishable from H
R ← Ω. In our proofs, Simhash will be perfectly indistinguishable
from H
R ← Ω.
Remark A.2 The adversary A used in experiment ExptSim
A (κ) deﬁned for simulation soundness
may query Simprove with strings w  ∈ L. For these strings, Simprove will return a proof σ such that
VSimhash(w,σ) returns true. However, by the deﬁnition of simulation-soundness, these proofs will
not help A produce any new valid proofs for any w  ∈ L.
A.1 Q details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP Q =( ProveΦQ,VerifyΦQ,SimΦQ) over the language
deﬁned by the predicate ΦQ, and we prove its security.12 As discussed above, when this SS-NIZKP
is used in protocol P,w el e tH be H3.
Recall that
ΦQ(τ,EC,B,V)
def = ∃β,π,γ :
 
B =
 
yβ,gβ
 
× (EC)π × (g−1,1)
 
and (V =( hγgπ,gγ)).
ProveΦQ, VerifyΦQ,a n dSimΦQ are implemented in Figures 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Note that
SimΦQ uses the standard technique of “backpatching” random oracle queries.
In the following, we include the subscript Q on the Serr and Simerr functions, and remove κ
from the parameters, since this is already implicit–Q is deﬁned over the group Gq where |q| = κ.
Lemma A.3 Q =( ProveΦQ,VerifyΦQ,SimΦQ) is an SS-NIZKP with SerrQ(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q ,a n d
SimerrQ(nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q3 .
Proof: Completeness: Straightforward.
Simulation soundness: Consider an adversary A that makes nro hash queries and npr ProveΦQ
queries.
12To be completely formal, the predicate ΦQ should also have parameters (Gq,g,y,h), but we choose to be slightly
less formal for readability.
30µ1,µ 2,ν
R ← Zq
B  ← (yµ1,gµ1) × (EC)µ2
V   ← (hνgµ2,gν)
e ← H(τ,EC,B,V,B ,V )
z1 ← βe+ µ1 mod q
z2 ← πe+ µ2 mod q
z3 ← γe+ ν mod q
σ ← (e,z1,z 2,z 3)
Return σ
Figure 4: ProveΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),(β,π,γ))
B  ← (yz1,gz1) × (EC)z2 × (B × (g,1))−e
V   ← (hz3gz2,gz3) × V −e
Return true if e = H(τ,EC,B,V,B ,V )
Figure 5: VerifyΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),(e,z1,z 2,z 3))
e
R ← Zq
z1,z 2,z 3
R ← Zq
B  ← (yz1,gz1) × (EC)z2 × (B × (g,1))−e
V   ← (hz3gz2,gz3) × V −e
H(τ,EC,B,V,B ,V ) ← e
σ ← (e,z1,z 2,z 3)
Return σ
Figure 6: SimproveΦQ(τ,EC,B,V): the protocol aborts if backpatching causes the hash function
to be inconsistent with a previous hash query. SimhashΦQ behaves like a normal random oracle,
except that it maintains consistency with the backpatching.
31Say A makes a query (τ,EC,B,V,B ,V ) to the random oracle, where (τ,EC,B,V) does not satisfy
ΦQ and (τ,EC,B,V,B ,V ) was not backpatched in a SimproveΦQ query. Say B =
 
yβ1,gβ2 
×
(EC)π × (g−1,1), V =( hγgπ,gγ), B  =( yµ1,gµ2) × (EC)µ3,a n dV   =( hνgµ3,gν), for some values
γ,β1,β 2,π,ν,µ 1,µ 2,µ 3 ∈ Zq.L e tc1,c 2,c 3,c 4 ∈ Zq be such that EC[1] = gc1, EC[2] = gc2, h = gc3,
and y = gc4. Then to have a proof σ =( e,z1,z 2,z 3) using this random oracle query such that
VerifyΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),σ)=true, it must be that
(c4β1 + c1π)e + c4µ1 + c1µ3 = c4z1 + c1z2 mod q,
(β2 + c2π)e + µ2 + c2µ3 = z1 + c2z2 mod q,
(c3γ + π)e + c3ν + µ3 = c3z3 + z2 mod q, and
γe+ ν = z3 mod q.
However, if (τ,EC,B,V) does not satisfy ΦQ, then β1  = β2, implying e =
µ1−µ2
β2−β1 mod q, and thus
there is at most one possible hash output that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q
probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a SimproveΦQ query that results in a backpatching on (τ,EC,B,V,B ,V ),
then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most nro+1
q , with the extra 1
q probability from A guessing
the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SerrQ(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q .
Zero-knowledge: The distributions of SimproveΦQ(τ,EC,B,V)a n dProveΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),(β,π,γ))
are exactly the same for any ((τ,EC,B,V),(β,π,γ)) in the relation deﬁned by ΦQ, except for the
cases when SimproveΦQ aborts. The probability that SimproveΦQ aborts is at most the probability
of a collision between the new (B ,V ) pair and any pair that appeared in a previous random oracle
query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that any V   ∈ Gq ×Gq is equally likely, and that
given a ﬁxed V  , and a ﬁxed e,z2,z 3, there are q values of B  ∈ Gq × Gq that are equally likely.
Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous pair is at most
nro+npr
q3 .S i n c eSimproveΦQ is
queried npr times, SimerrQ(nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q3 .
A.2 R details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP R =( ProveΦR,VerifyΦR,SimΦR) over the language
deﬁned by the predicate ΦR, and we prove its security. When this SS-NIZKP is used in protocol
P,w el e tH be H4.
Recall that
ΦR(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i )
def = ∃ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i : Bi ← Bri × (y,g)r 
i andVi ← (hγigri,gγi)and
V  
i ← (hγ 
i(V [1])ri,gγ 
i)andV   
i ← (hγ  
i (V [2])ri,gγ  
i ).
ProveΦR, VerifyΦR,a n dSimΦR are implemented in Figures 7, 8, and 9, respectively. Note that
SimΦR uses the standard technique of “backpatching” random oracle queries.
In the following, we include the subscript R on the Serr and Simerr functions, and remove κ
from the parameters, since this is already implicit–R is deﬁned over the group Gq where |q| = κ.
Lemma A.4 R =( ProveΦR,VerifyΦR,SimΦR) is an SS-NIZKP with SerrR(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q ,a n d
SimerrR(nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q5 .
32µ1,µ 2,ν 1,ν 2,ν 3
R ← Zq
˜ Bi ← Bµ1 × (yµ2,gµ2)
˜ Vi ← (hν1gµ1,gν1)
˜ V  
i ← (hν2(V [1])µ1,gν2)
˜ V   
i ← (hν3(V [2])µ1,gν3)
e ← H(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i , ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i )
z1 ← rie + µ1 mod q
z2 ← r 
ie + µ2 mod q
z3 ← γie + ν1 mod q
z4 ← γ 
ie + ν2 mod q
z5 ← γ  
i e + ν3 mod q
σ ← (e,z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5)
Return σ
Figure 7: ProveΦR((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ),(ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i,γ  
i ))
˜ Bi ← Bz1 × (yz2,gz2) × (Bi)−e
˜ Vi ← (hz3gz1,gz3) × (Vi)−e
˜ V  
i ← (hz4(V [1])z1,gz4) × (V  
i )−e
˜ V   
i ← (hz5(V [2])z1,gz5) × (V   
i )−e
Return true if e = H(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i , ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i )
Figure 8: VerifyΦR((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ),(e,z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5))
33e
R ← Zq
z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5
R ← Zq
˜ Bi ← Bz1 × (yz2,gz2) × (Bi)−e
˜ Vi ← (hz3gz1,gz3) × (Vi)−e
˜ V  
i ← (hz4(V [1])z1,gz4) × (V  
i )−e
˜ V   
i ← (hz5(V [2])z1,gz5) × (V   
i )−e
H(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i , ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i ) ← e
σ ← (e,z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5)
Return σ
Figure 9: SimproveΦR(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ): the protocol aborts if backpatching causes the hash
function to be inconsistent with a previous hash query. SimhashΦR behaves like a normal random
oracle, except that it maintains consistency with the backpatching.
Proof: Completeness: Straightforward.
Simulation soundness: Consider an adversary A that makes nro hash queries and npr ProveΦR
queries.
Say A makes a query (i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i , ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i ) to the random oracle, where the tuple
(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ) does not satisfy ΦR and (i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i , ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i )w a sn o tb a c k -
patched in a SimproveΦR query. Say Bi = Bri×
 
yr 
i,gr  
i
 
, Vi =( hγ1gri,gγ1), V  
i =
 
hγ2(V [1])β1,gγ2 
,
and V   
i =
 
hγ3(V [2])β2,gγ3 
, ˜ Bi = Bµ1 × (yµ2,gµ3), ˜ Vi =( hν1gµ1,gν1), ˜ V  
i =( hν2(V [1])µ4,gν2), and
˜ V   
i =( hν3(V [2])µ5,gν3), for some ri,r 
i,r  
i ,γ 1,γ 2,γ 3,β 1,β 2,µ 1,µ 2,µ 3,µ 4,µ 5,ν 1,ν 2,ν 3 ∈ Zq.L e t
c1,c 2,c 3,c 4 ∈ Zq be such that B[1] ≡ gc1, B[2] ≡ gc2, h ≡ gc3, y ≡ gc4, V [1] ≡ gc5,a n d
V [2] ≡ gc6. Then to have a proof σ =( e,z1,z 2,z 3,z 4,z 5) using this random oracle query such
that VerifyΦR((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ),σ)=true, it must be that
(c1ri + c4r 
i)e + c1µ1 + c4µ2 = c1z1 + c4z2 mod q,
(c2ri + r  
i )e + c2µ1 + µ3 = c2z1 + z2 mod q,
(c3γ1 + ri)e + c3ν1 + µ1 = c3z3 + z1 mod q,
γ1e + ν1 = z3 mod q,
(c3γ2 + c5β1)e + c3ν2 + c5µ4 = c3z4 + c5z1,
γ2e + ν2 = z4 mod q,
(c3γ3 + c6β2)e + c3ν3 + c6µ5 = c3z5 + c6z1 mod q, and
γ3e + ν3 = z5 mod q.
However, if (i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ) does not satisfy ΦR, then either (1) r 
i  = r  
i , implying e =
µ1−µ2
r  
i −r 
i
mod q,( 2 )r 
i = r  
i but β1  = ri, implying e =
µ4−µ1
ri−β1 mod q,o r( 3 )r 
i = r  
i and β1 = ri, but
34β2  = ri, implying e =
µ5−µ1
ri−β2 mod q.13 Thus there is at most one possible hash output that would
allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a SimproveΦR query that results in backpatching the random oracle on the
input (i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i , ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i ), then this random oracle query could not be used in a
fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most nro+1
q , with the extra 1
q probability from A guessing
the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SerrR(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q .
Zero-knowledge: The distributions of
SimproveΦR(i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i )a n d
ProveΦR((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ),(ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i,γ  
i ))
are the same for any ((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V 
i ,V  
i ),(ri,r 
i,γ i,γ 
i,γ  
i )) in the relation deﬁned by ΦR, except
for the cases when SimproveΦR aborts. The probability that SimproveΦR aborts is at most the
probability of a collision between the new (B,V, ˜ Bi, ˜ Vi, ˜ V  
i , ˜ V   
i ) tuple and any tuple that appeared
in a previous random oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that there are q5
possible tuple values that are equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous
pair is at most
nro+npr
q5 .S i n c eSimproveΦR is queried npr times, SimerrR(nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q5 .
A.3 S details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP S =( ProveΦS,VerifyΦS,SimΦS) over the language
deﬁned by the predicate ΦS, and we prove its security. As discussed above, when this SS-NIZKP
is used in protocol P,w el e tH be H5.
Recall that
ΦS(i,τ ,C i,R i)
def = ∃a,γ :
 
Ci = ga andRi =( hγ(h )a,gγ)
 
.
ProveΦS, VerifyΦS,a n dSimΦS are implemented in Figures 10, 11, and 12, respectively. Note that
SimΦS uses the standard technique of “backpatching” random oracle queries.
In the following, we include the subscript S on the Serr and Simerr functions, and remove κ
from the parameters, since this is already implicit–S is deﬁned over the group Gq where |q| = κ.
Lemma A.5 S =( ProveΦS,VerifyΦS,SimΦS)i sa nS S - N I Z K Pw i t hSerrS(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q ,a n d
SimerrS(nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q2 .
Proof: Completeness: Straightforward.
Simulation soundness: Consider an adversary A that makes nro hash queries and npr ProveΦS
queries.
Say A makes a query (i,τ ,C i,R i,W,R  ) to the random oracle, where (i,τ ,C i,R i) does not satisfy
ΦS and (i,τ ,C i,R i,W,R  ) was not backpatched in a SimproveΦS query. Say Ci = ga, Ri =
13It is also possible that no such e exists that satisﬁes these equations.
35µ,ν
R ← Zq
W ← gµ
R  ← (hν(h )µ,gν)
e ← H(i,τ ,C i,R i,W,R  )
z1 ← ae + µ mod q
z2 ← γe+ ν mod q
Γi ← (e,z1,z 2)
Return Γi
Figure 10: ProveΦS((i,τ ,C i,R i),(a,γ))
(e,z1,z 2) ← Γi
R  ← (hz2(h )z1(Ri[1])−e,gz2(Ri[2])−e)
W ← gz1(Ci)−e
Verify e = H(i,τ ,C i,R i,W,R  )
Figure 11: VerifyΦS((i,τ ,C i,R i),Γi)
e
R ← Zq
z1,z 2
R ← Zq
R  ← (hz2(h )z1(Ri[1])−e,gz2(Ri[2])−e)
W ← gz1(Ci)−e
H(i,τ ,C i,R i,W,R  ) ← e
Γi ← (e,z1,z 2)
Return Γi
Figure 12: SimproveΦS(i,τ ,C i,R i): the protocol aborts if backpatching causes the hash function
to be inconsistent with a previous hash query. SimhashΦS behaves like a normal random oracle,
except that it maintains consistency with the backpatching.
36(hζ(h )a 
,gζ), W = gµ,a n dR  =( hν(h )µ 
,gν), for some a,a ,γ,µ,µ  ,ν∈ Zq.L e tc,c  ∈ Zq be such
that h = gc and h  = gc 
. Then to have a proof σ =( e,z1,z 2) using this random oracle query such
that VerifyΦS((i,τ ,C i,R i),Γi)=true, it must be that
ae + µ = z1 mod q,
(cζ + c a )e +( cν + c µ )=cz2 + c z1 mod q, and
ζe+ ν = z2 mod q.
However, if (i,τ ,C i,R i) does not satisfy ΦS, then a  = a , implying e =
µ−µ 
a −a mod q, and thus there
is at most one possible hash output that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability
of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a SimproveΦS query that results in a backpatching on (i,τ ,C i,R i,W,R  ),
then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most nro+1
q , with the extra 1
q probability from A guessing
the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SerrS(nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q .
Zero-knowledge: The distributions of SimproveΦS(i,τ ,C i,R i)a n dProveΦS((i,τ ,C i,R i),(a,γ)) are
exactly the same for any ((i,τ ,C i,R i),(a,γ)) in the relation deﬁned by ΦS, except for the cases
when SimproveΦS aborts. The probability that SimproveΦS aborts is at most the probability of a
collision between the new W and R  values and any value that appeared in a previous random
oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that any W ∈ Gq and any R [2] ∈ Gq is
equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous value is at most
nro+npr
q2 .S i n c e
SimproveΦS is queried npr times, SimerrS(nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q2 .
A.4 T details
Here we show how to implement the SS-NIZKP T =( ProveΦT ,VerifyΦT ,SimΦT ) over the language
deﬁned by the predicate ΦT , and we prove its security. As discussed above, when this SS-NIZKP
is used in protocol P,w el e tH be H6.
Recall that
ΦT (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i)
def = ∃a,γ :
 
Ci = ga andCi = ga andRi =( hγ(h )a,gγ)
 
.
ProveΦT , VerifyΦT ,a n dSimΦT are implemented in Figures 13, 14, and 15, respectively. Note that
SimΦT uses the standard technique of “backpatching” random oracle queries.
In the following, we include the subscript T on the Serr and Simerr functions, and remove κ
from the parameters, since this is already implicit–T is deﬁned over the group Gq where |q| = κ.
Lemma A.6 T =( ProveΦT ,VerifyΦT ,SimΦT ) is an SS-NIZKP with SerrT (nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q ,a n d
SimerrT (nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q2 .
Proof: Completeness: Straightforward.
Simulation soundness: Consider an adversary A that makes nro hash queries and npr ProveΦT
queries.
37µ,ν
R ← Zq
W ← gµ
W ← gµ
R  ← (hν(h )µ,gν)
e ← H(i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i,W,W,R )
z1 ← ae + µ mod q
z2 ← γe+ ν mod q
Γ 
i ← (e,z1,z 2)
Return Γ 
i
Figure 13: ProveΦT ((i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i),(a,γ))
(e,z1,z 2) ← Γ 
i
R  ← (hz2(h )z1(Ri[1])−e,gz2(Ri[2])−e)
W ← gz1(Ci)−e
W ← gz1(Ci)−e
Verify e = H(i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i,W,W,R )
Figure 14: VerifyΦT ((i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i),Γ 
i)
e
R ← Zq
z1,z 2
R ← Zq
R  ← (hz2(h )z1(Ri[1])−e,gz2(Ri[2])−e)
W ← gz1(Ci)−e
W ← gz1(Ci)−e
H(i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i,W,W,R ) ← e
Γ 
i ← (e,z1,z 2)
Return Γ 
i
Figure 15: SimproveΦT (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i): the protocol aborts if backpatching causes the hash
function to be inconsistent with a previous hash query. SimhashΦT behaves like a normal random
oracle, except that it maintains consistency with the backpatching.
38Say A makes a query (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i,W,W,R ) to the random oracle, where (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i)
does not satisfy ΦT and (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i,W,R  ) was not backpatched in a SimproveΦT query. Say
Ci = ga, Ci = ga 
, Ri =( hζ(h )a  
,gζ), W = gµ, W = gµ 
,a n dR  =( hν(h )µ  
,gν), for some
a,a ,a   ,γ,µ,µ  ,µ   ,ν ∈ Zq.L e tc,c ,c    ∈ Zq be such that g = gc, h = gc 
,a n dh  = gc  
. Then to
have a proof σ =( e,z1,z 2) using this random oracle query such that VerifyΦT ((i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i),Γ 
i)=
true, it must be that
cae + cµ = cz1 mod q,
a e + µ  = z1 mod q,
(c ζ + c  a  )e +( c ν + c  µ  )=c z2 + c  z1 mod q, and
ζe+ ν = z2 mod q.
However, if (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i) does not satisfy ΦT , then either a  = a , implying e =
µ−µ 
a −a mod q,
or a = a  but a   = a  , implying e =
µ −µ  
a  −a  mod q.14 Thus there is at most one possible hash output
that would allow such a proof. Hence there is a 1/q probability of this query allowing such a proof.
Note that if A makes a SimproveΦT query that results in a backpatching on (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i,W,W,R ),
then this random oracle query could not be used in a fraudulent proof by A.
Then the probability that A succeeds is at most nro+1
q , with the extra 1
q probability from A guessing
the output of the random oracle without actually querying it. Thus SerrT (nro,n pr) ≤ nro+1
q .
Zero-knowledge: The distributions of
SimproveΦT (i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i)a n d
ProveΦT ((i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i),(a,γ))
are exactly the same for any ((i,τ ,g,Ci,C i,R i),(a,γ)) in the relation deﬁned by ΦT , except for the
cases when SimproveΦT aborts. The probability that SimproveΦT aborts is at most the probability
of a collision between the new W and R  values and any value that appeared in a previous random
oracle query (or previous backpatching). It is easy to see that any W ∈ Gq and any R [2] ∈ Gq is
equally likely. Therefore the probability of colliding with a previous value is at most
nro+npr
q2 .S i n c e
SimproveΦT is queried npr times, SimerrT (nro,n pr) ≤
npr(nro+npr)
q2 .
B Formal Speciﬁcation of the Protocol
Figures 16, 17, and 18 give the formal speciﬁcation of the protocol, where index(U) returns the index
of U ∈ Servers,a n d{Mi}i∈I  denotes  Mi1,...,M i   where I  = {i1,...,i  } and i1 < ···<i  .T h e
Initialization protocol (Figure 16) is run before any queries by the adversary. Note that in Figure 17,
C ← U simply denotes a renaming of U.
14It is also possible that no such e exists that satisﬁes these equations.
39Initialize(Gq)—
Let g be the generator for Gq
H0,H 1,H 2,H 3,H 4,H 5
R ← Ω
x
R ← Zq; y ← g
x (the global ElGamal key pair)
a0 ← x; forj ∈{ 1,...,k− 1}doaj
R ← Zq
letf(z)=
 k−1
j=0 ajz
j (polynomial secret sharing of x)
h ← H0(y)( H0(·) returns a random element of Gq)
h
  ← H1(y)( H1(·) returns a random element of Gq)
forC ∈ Clients do
πC
R ← PasswordC; α
R ← Zq; EC ← (y
αg
(πC)−1
,g
α)
fori ∈{ 1,2,...,n}do
x
 
i
R ← Zq; y
 
i ← g
x 
i (local ElGamal key pairs)
xi ← f(i); yi ← g
xi (ith (Feldman) secret/public shares of x)
distribute to server Si (xi,x
 
i,{EC}C∈Clients)
Publish (y,{yi}i∈{1,2,...,n},{y
 
i}i∈{1,2,...,n})
fori ∈ N and U ∈ ID do
state
i
U ← ready
acc
i
U ← term
i
U ← used
i
U ← false
sid
i
U ← pid
i
U ← sk
i
U ← ε
Figure 16: Speciﬁcation of protocol initialization
if U ∈ Clients then
sid ← pid ← sk ← ε acc ← term ← false C ← U
if state = ready then {Client Action 1}
 I ←msg-in where I = {i1,...,i k} and i1 < ···<i k
state ←  I  msg-out ←  C,I 
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
elseif state =  I  then {Client Action 2}
 ci1,...,c ik ←msg-in where cij ∈{ 0,1}
κ for all ij ∈ I
Obtain password π from user
˜ x,β,γ
R ← Zq ˜ y ← g
˜ x
B ← (y
β,g
β) × (EC)
π × (g
−1,1)
V ← (h
γg
π,g
γ)
τ ← ˜ y,ci1,...,c ik 
σ ← ProveΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),(β,π,γ))
for i ∈ I do
˜ yi ← (y
 
i)
˜ x Ki ← H2(I,τ,˜ yi)
msg-out ←  B,V,˜ y,σ 
acc ← term ← true state ← done sk ←  Ki1,...,K ik 
sid ←  C,I,τ,B,V,σ  pid ← I
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
Figure 17: Speciﬁcation of protocol (part 1: client side)
40if U ∈ Servers then
sid ← pid ← sk ← ε acc ← term ← false i ← index(U)
if state = ready then {Server Action 1}
 C,I ←msg-in where I = {i1,...,i k}, i1 < ···<i k, i ∈ I,a n dC ∈ Clients
c
 
i
R ← Zq state ←  C,I,c
 
i  msg-out ←  i,c
 
i 
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
elseif state =  C,I,c
 
i  then {Server Action 2}
 ci1,...,c ik ←msg-in where cij ∈{ 0,1}
κ for all ij ∈ I
ci ← c
 
i msg-out ← ε state ←  C,I,{cj}j∈I 
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
elseif state =  C,I,{cj}j∈I  then {Server Action 3}
 B,V,˜ y,σ ←msg-in
τ ← ˜ y,ci1,...,c ik 
if VerifyΦQ((τ,EC,B,V),σ) then
ri,r
 
i,γ i,γ
 
i,γ
  
i
R ← Zq
Bi ← B
ri × (y,g)
r 
i Vi ← (h
γig
ri,g
γi)
V
 
i ← (h
γ 
i(V [1])
ri,g
γ 
i) V
  
i ← (h
γ  
i (V [2])
ri,g
γ  
i )
σi ← ProveΦR((i,B,V,Bi,V i,V
 
i ,V
  
i ),(ri,r
 
i,γ i,γ
 
i,γ
  
i ))
msg-out ←  i,Bi,V i,V
 
i ,V
  
i ,σ i  state ←  C,I,τ,B,V,Bi, ˜ y,σ 
else state ← done msg-out ← ε
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
elseif state =  C,I,τ,B,V,Bi, ˜ y,σ  then {Server Action 4}
 Qi1,...,Q ik ←msg-in
for j ∈ I \{ i} do  Bj,V j,V
 
j,V
  
j ,σ j ←Qj
if ∀j ∈ I \{ i} :[ VerifyΦR((j,B,V,Bj,V j,V
 
j,V
  
j ),σ j)] then
τ
  ←  τ,B,V,Bi1,...,B ik,V i1,...,V ik 
(y,g) ←
 
j∈I Bj
ai ← λi,Ixi Ci ← g
ai
ζ
R ← Zq Ri ← (h
ζ(h
 )
ai,g
ζ)
for j ∈ I do Cj ← (yj)
λj,I
Γi ← ProveΦS((i,τ
 ,C i,R i),(ai,ζ));
msg-out ←  i,Ri,Γi  state ←  C,I,τ,B,V, ˜ y,σ,g,y,Ri,ζ,Ci,{Cj}j∈I 
else state ← done msg-out ← ε
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
elseif state =  C,I,τ,B,V, ˜ y,σ,g,y,Ri,ζ,Ci,{Cj}j∈I  then {Server Action 5}
 Qi1,...,Q ik ←msg-in
for j ∈ I \{ i} do  Rj,Γj ←Qj
if ∀j ∈ I \{ i} :[ VerifyΦS((j,τ
 ,C j,R j),Γj)] then
Γ
 
i ← ProveΦT ((i,τ
 ,g,Ci,C i,R i),(ai,ζ));
msg-out ←  i,Ci,Γ
 
i  state ←  C,I,τ,B,V, ˜ y,σ,g,y,Ci,{Cj}j∈I 
else state ← done msg-out ← ε
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
elseif state =  C,I,τ,B,V, ˜ y,σ,g,y,Ci,{Cj}j∈I  then {Server Action 6}
 Qi1,...,Q ik ←msg-in
for j ∈ I \{ i} do  Cj,Γ
 
j ←Qj
if y =Π j∈ICj and ∀j ∈ I \{ i} :[ VerifyΦT ((j,τ
 ,g,Cj,C j,R j),Γ
 
j)] then
˜ yi ← ˜ y
x 
i K ← H2(I,τ,˜ yi)
acc ← term ← true msg-out ← ε
sk ← K sid ←  C,I,τ,B,V,σ  pid ← C
else state ← done msg-out ← ε
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
else
msg-out ← ε
return (msg-out,acc,term,sid,pid,sk,state)
Figure 18: Speciﬁcation of protocol (part 2: server side)
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